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Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. 
Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering 
violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been 
responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white 
power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United 
States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-
wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study 
comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with 
planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of 
individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the 
religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It 
revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, 
as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the 
theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an 
unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with 
those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some 
answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. 
In fact, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano 
previously stated that countering violent extremism was a DHS priority.1 
Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering 
violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been 
responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white 
power domestic terrorism, specifically violent extremism from within the Texas 
based klaverns of the Ku Klux Klan. This research includes a background history 
of the Klan, including events specifically in Texas. 
The research also considers successful methods from the United States 
and the United Kingdom (UK), including efforts to counter the Salafi-jihadist 
narrative and gang intervention techniques. While these methods were not for 
the white supremacist movement, they may apply to the right wing in efforts to 
counter violent extremism. In addition to reviewing the successes, and 
considering the failures, of other methods, the research uses primary source 
case study comparisons. Significantly, limited research is available that uses 
primary sources. The individuals who participated were actively involved with 
planned domestic terror plots within the United States, when they formerly held 
leadership positions within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the 
religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA).  
The results of the research were surprising in that they revealed a 
common anti-government theme between the vastly different ideological groups. 
In addition, the research revealed the sociological underpinnings for participation 
in the Klan. The motivation to join and continue participation is explained using 
Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is the theoretical framework for the research. 
Although not a new concept, SIT is applied largely to Islamist organizations in an 
1 Brian Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the 
White House,” Watermark, 2012, 2. 
 xi 
                                            
effort to counter violent extremism. Interestingly, the same framework works well 
in application to the right-wing movement also. While extremism is an unpleasant 
fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who 
once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers. Much 
more research is needed in the arena of countering white power violent 
extremism, but this research provides a starting point for those who follow. 
 xii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM SPACE–BACKGROUND 
When asked about the presence of white supremacist organizations, the 
response of some law enforcement leaders is, “We don’t have that problem 
here.” It can only be assumed a level of denial is apparent that any “problem” 
exists. Since many deny the “problem” exists, a lack of concern and a negative 
attitude toward attempts to counter violent extremism from white supremacist 
organizations also exists. At a White House conference, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano stated countering violent 
extremism was a DHS priority.1 The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and similar 
organizations certainly qualify as organizations likely to spawn violent extremism.  
Documented attempts of KKK members planning or performing acts of 
violence are available. Two examples of the very real threat posed by the KKK 
include a conspiracy to bomb a Wise County, Texas, natural gas processing 
plant owned by Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation, and the dragging 
death of James Byrd Jr. in Jasper, Texas.2 Since the KKK is alive and well in the 
United States, it is necessary to understand their ideology and motivations, and 
determine methods to mitigate extremist violence posed by far right members 
within the organization.  
Individuals within the KKK are drawn together by a common bond of belief 
in God and racial purity.3 An effective approach to countering extremism within 
1 Brian Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the 
White House,” Watermark, 2012, 2. 
2 Sam Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot,” 
New York Times, April 25, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/25/us/us-officials-link-klan-
faction-to-1-of-4-people-held-in-texas-bomb-plot.html; David Carson, “Texas Execution 
Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer,” TX Executions, September 23, 2011, 
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/475.asp. 
3 “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel, released September 27, 2005 (New York, 
NY: NY: A & E Home Video, 2005), DVD; “Klan of Killers,” Gangland, season 5, episode 2, 
produced by Elizabeth Tyson, aired June 4, 2009 (New York, NY: A & E Home Video, 2009), 
DVD. 
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the KKK must acknowledge the differences in beliefs held by the membership 
and the overall community, yet include an agreement to suspend judgment. 
According to Chip Berlet, radical change in conversation is a step toward 
establishing a relationship.4 This method of “disarming” the movement previously 
proved successful with the Posse Comitatus.5 Extremism will never be abolished, 
but it is necessary to counter extremist violence and if history is capable of 
repeating itself, building a relationship with KKK members is a step toward 
countering violent extremism from within the movement. 
This research compares two separate cases involving former white 
supremacist leaders who prevented, or aborted, acts of domestic terrorism from 
their organizations. The research details the events involving each leader, along 
with insights into the organizations, and the overall white supremacist culture. 
Interviews with the specific leaders of a Texas KKK group and an Arkansas 
Christian Identity group serve as the basis of this research. The primary goal of 
the interviews was to determine if general knowledge of a specific group's 
ideologies provides enough information for law enforcement and counterterrorism 
leaders going forward to establish a process of countering violent extremism, 
specifically from within the KKK in Texas.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research addresses five important questions related to white 
extremist issues. 
• Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
• Are there generational differences in leadership that effect 
interactions with the group? 
• Does religion influence race relations? 
• What induces participation in the group? 
• Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to 
counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
4 Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, “Militia Nation,” The Progressive 59 (June 1995): 25. 
5 Ibid. 
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C. HYPOTHESES 
The expected results of the research questions include the following. 
• It is possible to counter KKK violent extremism. The Posse 
Comitatus, also a right-wing group, declined following a successful 
intervention.6 In addition, other countries have successfully 
combated domestic terrorism, so it is possible to counter Klan 
violence as well.7  
• Generational differences in leaders and members affect the chance 
of interacting with right-wing groups for counterterrorism efforts. 
Older members are more likely to have “traditional” American 
values and are, therefore, more likely to assist law enforcement in 
the prevention of violence aimed at innocents in the furtherance of 
their ideology.  
• Based on their history as protector of the white Protestant America, 
the KKK potentially has strong religious beliefs.8 Therefore, it is 
likely that religion influences race relations in the KKK, considered 
by most to be a racially motivated hate group. 
• The desire to participate in the KKK is best explained through the 
lens of SIT. Individuals naturally feel a desire to belong to a group 
that provides them with a positive self-image. Those in search of 
this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to 
join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.9 The group will be 
of like-minded individuals, who bolster the individual, and increase 
the positive feelings associated with their identity.  
• “Balanced-power” is a feasible approach to countering KKK violent 
extremism. Drawing on successes and failures in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, Brad Deardorff suggests 
implementing Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC 
Centers) to oversee local counterterrorism efforts.10 The ROC  
 
6 Berlet and Lyons, “Militia Nation,” 25. 
7 Robert Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 35–38. 
8 David Mark Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1987), 33. 
9 Fathali M Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological 
Implications for Democracy in Global Context (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2008), 94–95; Michael A Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social identifications a social 
psychology of intergroup relations and group processes (London; New York: Routledge, 1988). 
10 R. Brad Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism 
(Agile Press, 2013), 223. 
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Center, although intended to focus on countering the Salafi-jihadi 
narrative, has the potential to be applicable to many different types 
of organizations, including white supremacists.11  
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the research is the exploration of SIT in the context of 
practitioner application. Extensive research and literature is available on 
counterterrorism efforts aimed at Islamist organizations. Also available is 
extensive literature on the right-wing movement as a whole, but little on 
counterterrorism efforts involving white supremacist groups. Additionally, most 
research on white supremacist groups is presented in a potentially biased 
manner.  
This research stands to add to the body of work, terrorism studies. It 
appears in an unbiased, academic manner, and includes efforts to present a fair 
and accurate representation of the individual cases and the people involved. It 
also provides primary source research aimed at domestic counterterrorism in an 
environment fueled by concerns of international terrorism, and based largely on 
secondary source research. The research sits against the backdrop of the 
practical experience of the researcher, which stems from 16 years in law 
enforcement.  
Lastly, the research serves to remind society that domestic violent 
extremism, fueled by racially motivated hatred, still exists in the county. The idea 
of discussing race needs to be confronted and accepted for what it is, a 
constitutionally protected right of free speech. While individuals may not agree 
with expressions of hate, society needs to look racism in the face, accept the 
ugly trust of prejudice, and find the courage to go beyond hate to confront white 
power violent extremism. 
11 Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 186, 189.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
When considering white supremacist organizations in the Dallas/Ft. Worth 
(DFW) area, one must first take into account the Aryan Circle (AC) and the Aryan 
Brotherhood of Texas (ABT), whose members largely reside in the southeastern 
portion of the City of Dallas and its neighboring suburbs.12 Both the AC and ABT 
are classified as criminal gangs rather than white supremacist groups.13 This 
classification is due their likelihood to do business with people regardless of race 
or ethnicity, and that some members have Hispanic girlfriends.14 Hispanic 
ethnicity falls within the Caucasian race, but many groups see them as separate 
and not true Aryans. However, according to a former leader within the KKK, the 
groups collaborate and work together.15 The question begs then, why is “Aryan” 
part of these groups’ self-identified label? Looking at this phenomenon through 
the lens of SIT, it is evidence of what Henri Tajfel, in his work Social Identity and 
Intergroup Relations, explains as the process related to stereotyping, where the 
in-group perceives an intragroup, or within the group, similarity that enhances the 
members’ positive self-identity.16 Tajfel refers to the process of stereotyping as 
Referent Informational Influence (RII), which happens in three phases.17 The first 
phase involves the individual self-identifying as a member of a specific category, 
12 ADL, “The Aryan Brotherhood of Texas,” April 4, 2013, http://www.adl.org/combating-
hate/domestic-extremism-terrorism/c/aryan-brotherhood-texas-report.html; The Aryan Circle: 
Crime in the Name of Hate (New York, NY: Anti-Defamation League, October 2009), 11; “Circle 
of Death,” Gangland, season 5, episode 8, aired July 16, 2009 (New York, NY: A & E Home 
Video, 2009), DVD; “Aryan Terror,” Gangland, season 4, episode 7, aired March 26, 2009 (New 
York, NY: A & E Home Video, 2009), DVD; personal knowledge of the researcher, based on 
employment. 
13 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends (Washington, DC: National Gang 
Intelligence Center, 2011), 31, 44, 76; The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate, 7, 22, 28; 
Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment. 
14 “Aryan Terror,” Gangland; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment. 
15 Robert Spence, in interview with the author, September 5, 2013. 
16 Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, reissue (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 29–30. 
17 Ibid., 31. 
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in this case, the Aryan race.18 Next, the individuals learn and apply specific 
desirable behaviors to their self-identified category.19 Last, the individual assigns 
norms to themselves, related to their self-identified category, which become 
stereotypical normal behavior related to positive membership within the in-
group.20 Thus, anyone whose behavior or characteristics fall outside the norm of 
the in-group necessarily becomes a stereotypical member of the out-group, or 
the “other.”21  
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), within the AC, racial 
solidarity is also useful in binding the membership together in a familial 
relationship.22 The racial solidarity relates to membership in the Aryan race and 
does not include those of Hispanic ethnicity, which is evidence of the in-group 
comparing themselves to the “other,” or out-group, to validate and cement their 
positive self-identity associated with membership within their organization.23 
According to Tajfel, the group “aims to differentiate itself from others in order to 
achieve or maintain superiority on some existing and situationally relevant 
dimension of comparison.”24 In this instance, some AC and ABT members do not 
consider Hispanics members of the white race to elevate themselves above the 
out-group, and increase their self-worth related to membership within the in-
group, or their chosen personal group.  
Since much of law enforcement and many community leaders deny the 
“problem” exists, a lack of concern and a negative attitude occurs toward 
attempts to counter violent extremism from white supremacist organizations. At a 
White House conference, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated countering 
18 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 31. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 28–33. 
22 The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate, 4, 24. 
23 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 156. 
24 Ibid. 
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violent extremism was a DHS priority.25 The KKK and similar organizations 
certainly qualify as organizations likely to spawn violent extremism.26 
Documented attempts of KKK members planning or performing acts of violence 
are available.27 Two examples of the very real threat posed by the KKK include a 
conspiracy to bomb a Wise County, Texas, natural gas processing plant owned 
by Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation, and the dragging death of 
James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas.28 During April 1997, following an investigation, 
the FBI arrested a group of four KKK members for conspiracy to bomb a natural 
gas plant, which was meant to divert attention from a planned armored car 
robbery, the proceeds of which were to start a racial holy war.29 This incident, 
dubbed “Operation Sour Gas” by the FBI, is covered in detail in this research. In 
addition, in June 1998, Lawrence Brewer, who had ties to a KKK affiliated prison 
gang, along with two other men, dragged James Byrd, Jr. to his death in Jasper, 
25 Seals, “CHDS Alumni Invited to Countering Violent Extremism Conference at the White 
House,” 2. 
26 Spence, interview; Kerry Noble, in interview with the author, August 14, 2013. 
27 Christine Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns: Texas Monthly,” Texas Monthly, January 1998, 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/1998-01-01/crime.php; Andrew Blejwas, Anthony Griggs, and Mark 
Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing,” 
Southern Poverty Law Center, Summer 2005, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-
report/browse-all-issues/2005/summer/terror-from-the-right-0?page=0,3; David Carson, “Texas 
Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer,” TX Executions, September 23, 2011, 
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/475.asp; Agence France-Presse, “Ku Klux Klan Member 
Executed over 1998 Texas Murder,” The Raw Story, September 21, 2011, http://www.rawstory 
.com/rs/2011/09/21/ku-klux-klan-member-executed-over-1998-texas-murder/; Mike Malloy, “April 
(Gun) Showers,” Huff Post Politics, March 30, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-
malloy/april-gun-showers_b_519274.html; Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 
People Held in Texas Bomb Plot”; Terry Wallace, “Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot 
Targeting Gas Processing Plant,” Texas News, April 25, 1997, http://www.texnews.com/texas97/ 
terror042597.html; State of Texas V. Lawrence Russell Brewer (District 1A, Jasper County, Texas 
1999); Ku Klux Klan Rebounds; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5,” 
December 16, 2010, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/december/klan_121610; Southern 
Poverty Law Center, “Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since 
Oklahoma City,” (n.d.), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/terror-from-the-right. 
28 Verhovek, “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot”; 
Carson, “Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer.” 
29 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5.” 
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Texas.30 Brewer was convicted of capital murder on September 20, 1999, in 
Jasper County District Court 1-A, Docket #8870, and later executed on 
September 21, 2011.31  
Right wing groups are not responsible for as many deaths in the United 
States as radical Islamists, but the threat is no less real.32 The actions of Wade 
Michael Page at the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin on August 5, 2012, are evidence 
of the ongoing danger posed by extremist violence tied to members of white 
supremacist groups.33 The possibility of violent extremism within the KKK has 
not disappeared, but is operating underground. The clandestine nature of the 
groups is common knowledge for authorities and advocated by leaders within the 
movement.34 Society must accept a presence of white supremacist organizations 
are in existence in the North Texas area and make a concerted effort to counter 
violent extremism from within their ranks. 
This research focuses on countering violent extremism from factions of the 
KKK in the North Texas area. It is, therefore, necessary to begin by presenting a 
brief history of the KKK in the United States and Texas to provide the reader a 
basic understanding of the historical facts of the organization, ideology, 
motivations of the membership, and understanding of why the organization has 
30 Doug Miller, “James Byrd’s Killer: ‘I’d Do It All over Again’,” Kens5.com San Antonio, 
September 21, 2011, http://www.kens5.com/news/130314468.html; Greg Abbott, “Attorney 
General of Texas, (n.d.), https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagNews/release.php?id=3852; Carson, 
“Texas Execution Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer.” 
31 Miller, “James Byrd’s Killer: ‘I’d Do It All over Again’”; Carson, “Texas Execution 
Information—Report: Lawrence Brewer”; “Texas Attorney General”; State of Texas V. Lawrence 
Russell Brewer (District 1A, Jasper County, Texas 1999). 
32 Johnston’s Archives, “Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United States,” May 
18, 2013, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html. 
33 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Oak Creek Sikh Temple Shooting Investigation 
Conclusion,” November 20, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/milwaukee/press-releases/2012/oak-creek-
sikh-temple-shooting-investigation-conclusion; John Diedrich, “FBI Warrant Details Sikh Temple 
Shooter’s Online White Power Searches,” JSOnline, May 13, 2013, http://www.jsonline.com/news 
/milwaukee/fbi-warrant-details-sikh-temple-shooters-online-white-power-searches-jr9udd1-
207291121.html. 
34 Louis R. Beam Jr., “Leaderless Resistance,” Issue 12, Final Edition, The Seditionist, 
February 1992, http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm; “Klan of Killers,” Gangland; Personal 
knowledge of the researcher, based on employment. 
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persisted over the decades. While theology plays a part in the CSA case study, a 
history of Christian Identity theology is not necessary for this thesis.35 Minor 
background information is available in the CSA case study to inform the reader. 
However, since the focus of this research is on the KKK specifically, whose 
ideology includes theological portions related to out-group categorizations rather 
than theological motivations, that information is not included in the background 
chapter.36 
The KKK is considered the oldest domestic terrorist organization in the 
United States and was established in December 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee.37 
The six founders were former Confederate soldiers, college educated, and 
looking for fraternal social enjoyment.38 While no violent intentions occurred 
initially, this situation changed as the organization morphed over the years. 
During Reconstruction, society perceived the KKK as the enforcers of Southern 
American values.39 At this time in history, the Southern whites felt 
disenfranchised by what they saw as radical government actions during the 
period of Reconstruction and they felt threatened by the thought of a black 
insurrection, especially since blacks formed the majority of the population.40 As 
violence increased, Imperial Wizard Nathan Bedford Forrest, former Confederate 
General, formally disbanded the KKK in January 1869.41 Most Klan groups 
complied, but others continued until mass arrests resulted in compliance of the 
35 David W. Brannan, “The Evolution of the Church of Israel: Dangerous Mutations,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 3 (1999): 106–118, doi:10.1080/09546559908427519; 
David Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious 
Christian Identity” (St. Andrew’s University, Scotland, 2006). 
36 David Brannan and Anders Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: 
A Handbook for Practitioners (Monterey, CA: Unpublished Draft Copy, 2012), 27. 
37 “The Ku Klux Klan,” Directed by Bill Brummel; Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 8. 
38 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 8–9. 
39 Ibid., 13; D. L. (Daniel Love) Wilson, J. C. Lester, and Walter Lynwood Fleming, Ku Klux 
Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment, n.d., Kindle edition, loc 109 of 2871. 
40 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 16–17. 
41 Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment, Kindle 
edition, loc 153 of 2871; Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 19. 
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continuing groups in 1872.42 By this time, the organization began its return to an 
acceptable societal norm, where occasional violence occurred, “but it was not 
masked and did not ride at night.”43  
It is important to understand the motivations for these Klan founders, and 
why society accepted their presence, and even encouraged, their interventions. 
For the white Southerner, the KKK was perceived to be the protector of general 
Southern honor and values, which included their views on the role of white 
women (viewed as a repository of societal honor), and often viewed as 
representing the heart of their Southern culture.44 The Klan perceived 
Reconstruction era activities as a challenge to this Southern honor, which as a 
social capital is a limited good.45 In response to the challenge, the Klan is 
obligated to respond, to “protect” this honor of their perceived in-group, white 
America.46 According to Annie Burton in 1916, “…the grand old Order had 
accomplished what it set out to do. Its work was nobly done; and our rescued 
South still sings her gratitude to her heaven-sent protectors, the mysterious 
K.K.K.”47 The Klan was in a patron-client relationship with white America, where 
they served as protector, or patron, to the people of the South, their clients, who 
in turn honored them as the only power who could have saved them during that  
 
 
42 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 19; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence 
(Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011), 15. 
43 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 19; Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, 
Growth and Disbandment, loc 152 of 2871; Annie Cooper Burton, The Ku Klux Klan (Los 
Angeles, California: Warren T. Potter, 1916), Kindle edition, loc 9 of 338; Ku Klux Klan: A History 
of Racism and Violence, 15. 
44 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 21. 
45 David W. Brannan and Anders Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland 
Security” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 8, 2012); Brannan and Strindberg, 
Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners, 37–38. 
46 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 38. 
47 Burton, The Ku Klux Klan, loc 74 of 338. 
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time.48 The notion of the KKK “as the savior of an oppressed people during the 
dark days of Reconstruction” would hold fast for future generations and become 
“the treasured folk heritage.”49 
D. W. Griffith’s film, The Birth of a Nation, which glorified the Klan, was a 
phenomenal success.50 To those Southerners who embraced the KKK as the 
protector who returned order to the South, the film glorified the Klan, and 
strengthened the in-group narrative, including the positive identity the members 
received based on their Klan association.51 The film solidified the Klan’s position 
in society, and therefore, their in-group status; and the spotlight Griffith placed on 
the KKK also offered them a chance to be reborn, an opportunity that William J. 
Simmons seized.52 In addition, the racially motivated themes in the film further 
subjected blacks to the minority out-group status they already held, only more 
so.53 Griffith’s film and Simmons’ leadership facilitated the growth of a new Klan 
era of increased memberships and political power across the country. As with the 
original intent of the founding members, the KKK was not a right-wing terrorist 
group, but rather a fraternal organization that embraced the ideal of the American 
white Protestant as supreme.54 Important to consider is the emphasis on the idea 
of fraternity, which “had long since come to mean the exclusiveness of the in-
group, rather than the commonality and brotherhood of mankind.”55 According to 
David M. Chalmers, “Probably the greatest strength of the Invisible Empire lay 
48 Burton, The Ku Klux Klan, loc 9 of 338; Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of 
Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners, 40. 
49 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 23. 
50 Ibid., 25–28; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 21; Burton, The Ku Klux 
Klan, loc 9 of 338. 
51 Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment, Kindle 
edition, loc 109 of 2871; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 21; Moghaddam, 
Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 95, 97. 
52 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 25–28. 
53 Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 21; Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and 
Intergroup Relations, 98. 
54 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 30. 
55 Ibid., 31; Wilson, Lester, and Fleming, Ku Klux Klan Its Origin, Growth and Disbandment, 
loc 109 of 2871. 
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not in its creed, but in its excitement and in-group fraternalism.”56 Chalmers, 
perhaps unknowingly, introduces SIT as a theoretical framework to explain Klan 
membership.57 The importance of in-group dynamics is the group provides 
members with a positive self-identity.58  
During the 1920s, the Klan found their focus on anti-Catholicism, which 
attributed to the success of the KKK during the high point in its history.59 As 
opposed to a focus on theology, the focus was on opposing that which is different 
and therefore cannot assimilate into American society.60 The KKK viewed the 
Catholics as such, whom they believed were subjugated to Papal rule, and 
therefore, anti-American.61 Again, the KKK emerges as protector, as white 
Protestant America sees itself as under attack.62 The actions of the Klan in 
response to Catholicism and fears of Papal rule typify the SIT analytical markers, 
honor-shame, and challenge-response.63 First, without honor, a group is useless 
so it must act to avoid the shame of failure to protect white Protestant America.64 
Honor is social capital, which serves as a commodity to trade between the Klan, 
in-group, and the “other,” out-groups.65 In trading the commodity of honor, the 
Klan makes negative honor challenges toward the out-group, while also making 
56 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 13. 
57 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 27. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 33; Ezra Asher Cook, Ku Klux Klan Secrets Exposed 
Attitude toward Jews, Catholics, Foreigners and Masons. Fraudulent Methods Used. Atrocities 
Committed in Name of Order (Chicago, IL, 1922), Kindle edition, loc 250 of 881, 535 to 648 of 
881. 
60 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 110–111; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and 
Violence, 15. 
61 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 110–111. 
62 Ibid., 112–113. 
63 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 37–38. 
64 Ibid.; Brannan and Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security.” 
65 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 37–39. 
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positive honor challenges within the in-group.66 This challenge serves to 
increase the positive identity associated with positions held within the in-group, in 
addition to further elevating the status of the in-group above that of the out-group; 
hereby, further increasing the positive association of membership in the Klan for 
the in-group members.67  
Second, a particular group faces an initial challenge, which it must 
perceive as such, which elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of 
defense and evaluation by society.68 Should the group see an action as a 
negative honor challenge, it is obliged to respond. Response allows the group to 
avoid the loss of honor, or any transaction capital it defends.69 Despite its power 
during that time, the violent tactics embraced by the Klan eventually led to its 
downfall as the press publicly displayed its weaknesses and failures.70 In the 
end, “Terror went too far; the extremists ranted too loudly and the leaders were 
too immoral and uninspiringly inept.”71 
The State of Texas had crucial ties to the KKK during this time and was 
the first location issued a charter and listed as an independent governing faction 
of what came to be the Invisible Empire.72 The KKK saw success in local 
elections in Texas, as well as the election of Earl B. Mayfield, the first member of 
the KKK elected to hold office in the United States Senate.73 In addition, Dallas, 
Texas dentist Hiram Wesley Evans would later rise to power as the Imperial 
Wizard of the Invisible Empire when he wrested control of the entire organization 
66 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 37–38. 
67 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 94–98. 
68 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 38. 
69 Brannan and Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security”; Brannan and 
Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners. 
70 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 295–297. 
71 Ibid., 299. 
72 Ibid., 39. 
73 Ibid.; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 22. 
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from William Simmons in late 1922.74 At the height of power, the KKK boasted 
between two and three million members during the mid-1920s.75 
In October 1946, Dr. Samuel Green once again revived the organization 
with the tried and true purpose of protecting, home, hearth, the virtue of the white 
woman, and Americanism.76 The rebirth met with little success as society was 
unwilling to tolerate the violence of a terrorist organization within their midst.77 
Henry P. Fry, former Klansman stated in his work, The Modern Ku Klux Klan, 
“There is no place in America for an ‘Invisible Empire’ of hate and venom; and 
there is no provision in the laws of this country for an ‘Emperor’!”78 Upon the 
death of Green in August 1949, the organization broke apart and individual 
factions of the KKK became the new norm.79 For instance, the following Klans all 
exist in Texas alone: American White Knights of the KKK, Bayou Knights of the 
KKK, Traditional Christian Knights of the KKK, White Camelia Knights of the 
KKK, United White Knights of the KKK, United Klans of America, Southern 
Kalvary Knights of the KKK, Loyal White Knights of the KKK, Lone Wolf Brigade 
Knights - Knights of the KKK, Empire Knights of the KKK, and United White 
Knights of the KKK.80 Other areas throughout the United States have multiple 
manifestations of the Klan as well, all of which differ based on the individual  
 
 
74 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 100–108; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and 
Violence, 20. 
75 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 291; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 
22. 
76 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 325–326. 
77 Ibid., 334. 
78 Henry Peck Fry, The Modern Ku Klux Klan (Cambridge, MA: Small, Maynard & Company, 
1922), Kindle edition, loc 30 of 259. 
79 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 334–342; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and 
Violence, 23. 
80 Ku Klux Klan Rebounds, 17; Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map,” (n.d.), 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map#s=ME. 
 14 
                                            
Klaverns.81 Therefore, with multiple different groups spread around the nation, 
the idea of a single Klan ideal or unity is a myth, and not accurate at the group 
level. 
It was not until May 17, 1954, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on 
Brown v. Board of Education, and brought about the new era of desegregation, 
that the KKK arose with a new purpose, and following.82 Once again white 
America felt threatened, and once again, the KKK reemerged as “protector” and 
enforcer of white American values and Klan ideological honor. The KKK’s priority 
was no longer the protection of white Americans from the threat of Papal rule, as 
the rise of the black American and the prospects of integration presented a much 
greater threat in their minds.83 According to Amy Gutmann in her work, Identity in 
Democracy, the Klan could “…credibly claim to represent a subordinated group: 
nonaffluent white Southern men who feel themselves to be increasingly 
marginalized in society…”84 Once again, the patron Klan rises to protect its 
client, white America, in this challenge to their honor, or personal status in 
society, so as to avoid the shame of failure to act.85 This period also brought with 
it a greater amount of violence from the KKK. With integration and the Civil 
Rights movements of the 1960s, not only did the violence increase, but so did the 
membership rosters of the KKK. The organization reportedly swelled its ranks by 
five to 10 thousand members, although greatly reduced from the numbers during 
the height of the Invisible Empire.86 By the end of the 1960s, the larger American  
 
81 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map”; Ku Klux Klan Rebounds, 14–17. 
82 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 343; National Park Service, “Brown v. Board of 
Education,” (n.d.), http://www.nps.gov/brvb/historyculture/upload/brown%20US%20supreme 
%20court.pdf. 
83 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 377. 
84 Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 228. 
85 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 37–40. 
86 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 384; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 
25–27. 
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society accepted the racial changes and their savior, the KKK, was no longer 
necessary as people grew tired of the violence and the organization due to the 
focus of law enforcement and Congress.87 
At the end of the 1970s, the Klan again saw a resurgence and, while not 
comparing in numbers to previous periods, a growth occurred within the ranks of 
the organization.88 The resurgence was in response to economic anxiety and the 
inability of the Southerner to accept racial change.89 The middle class worker 
perceived that the advancement of the black man resulted in a reversal for the 
white man.90 From a theoretical framework, this perception is evidence of the 
group function within the SIT analytical framework and the importance of 
identifying cultural markers, like group honor as a perceived limited good within 
the honor challenge cycle.91 To clarify, any social capital is in limited quantity, 
and in this case, that capital is the limited good of Southern white honor. The 
dwindling capital of Southern white honor is visible in the KKK’s treatment during 
protests, versus the treatment received by individuals protesting during the Civil 
Rights movement.92 For example, in August 1979, authorities arrested Imperial 
Wizard Bill Wilkinson’s members for operating without a permit during a protest 
march, while they saw the followers of Martin Luther King, Jr. rally on the steps of 
the Alabama capital.93 Seeing these followers only served to reinforce their fears 
about the results of racial equality and changes in the law and social order.  
In the early 1980s, David Duke was recognized for his efforts to recruit 
young, educated individuals, and change the image of the KKK from an 
87 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 386, 396; Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and 
Violence, 27; ADL, “Ku Klux Klan—History,” (n.d.), http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/kkk/ 
history.asp?xpicked=4&item=kkk. 
88 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 406; “Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in America.” 
89 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 406–407. 
90 Ibid., 410; Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, 228. 
91 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners; Brannan and Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security.” 
92 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 410. 
93 Ibid. 
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uneducated blue-collar worker to that of a sophisticated individual interested in 
the advancement of the white race rather than the oppression of others.94 Duke, 
young, articulate, and well dressed, improved the public image of the Klan for a 
time, and was even allowed to run for political office.95 These efforts were not 
sustainable within the movement, in part because the larger American society no 
longer widely accepted what many now consider acts of terrorism, rather than 
defensive acts, to protect in-group ideals and identity.  
Throughout its history, the KKK has seen multiple declines and 
resurgences.96 Currently, the estimated membership of KKK groups is 
approximately 5,000 across the United States, but others feel those numbers are 
much higher.97 In addition to their base ideologies and motivations, individuals 
within the KKK come together through a common bond of belief in God and racial 
purity.98 Further, basic human needs of inclusion permeate the groups, as 
members join for a sense of belonging and ritual, an individual freedom allowing 
people to express their individual identities within the setting of the group 
association.99  
From 2000 to 2008, the United States saw a 54% increase in hate group 
membership throughout the country.100 Others say the membership has 
dwindled so much, and become so fractured that the KKK is no longer a 
threat.101 The group has reinvented itself numerous times since its formation, 
94 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 412–414; “Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in America”; Ku 
Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 35. 
95 Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 35; “Ku Klux Klan—Extremism in 
America.” 
96 A&E Television Networks, The Ku Klux Klan—A Secret History; Ku Klux Klan Rebounds, 
1–2; Chalmers, Hooded Americanism. 
97 Ku Klux Klan Rebounds, 2; Spence, interview. 
98 “Klan of Killers,” Gangland; Spence, interview. 
99 “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel; Spence, interview; Tajfel, Social Identity and 
Intergroup Relations, 157; Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 100; Gutmann, 
Identity in Democracy, 86, 90; Spence, interview; Noble, interview. 
100 “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel. 
101 Ibid. 
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however, and ignoring this reinvention is a mistake because history shows it is 
strongest when able to capitalize on the fears of white America.102 “History 
suggests the Klan will not disappear. They have died many deaths, only to be 
reborn when white America felt threatened.”103  
It is important to consider the idea of the fraternity of the organization is to 
understand the ability to cross over into the accepted use of violence. According 
to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, the psychology of an individual 
produces that person’s reality.104 “Beyond this, however, the reality of everyday 
life is ongoingly affirmed in the individual’s interaction with others.”105 Berger and 
Luckmann further explain the result of this interaction is the institutionalization of 
the social construction of the group’s reality.106 In essence, like-minded 
individuals, with strong beliefs, form the basis of the KKK. These individuals each 
bring their own ideals into the organization, which meld together into the 
collective reality of the group. With the collective reality of a group, groupthink is 
more likely, which leads to terrorist acts of “self defense” being considered 
justifiable. The belief by the collective is, in response to the threat of 
Reconstruction, Catholicism, integration, immigration, etc., it is acceptable, even 
expected, to use "self defense.”  
As the individual members of the KKK pledged devotion to the group, the 
other members become a reflection of the individual who sees “his fellow 
Klansmen…in the mirror of his own self-respect, to succeed, by whatever 
means.”107 “Having thus emotionally crossed over the threshold of violence, the 
Klansman was highly likely to turn to action.”108 In addition to the individual 
102 Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence, 27. 
103 “The Ku Klux Klan,” directed by Bill Brummel. 
104 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge (Anchor, 1967), 178. 
105 Ibid., 149. 
106 Ibid., 182. 
107 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 376. 
108 Ibid. 
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transformation, consider also the acceptance of violence, in certain 
circumstances, by society. According to Edgar Z. Friedenberg, society accepts a 
certain level of violence directed at protection against potential disruption.109 This 
justification also allows the KKK to commit violence, condoned by not only the in-
group but society as well, and thus, further cementing the heritage of the KKK as 
protector and patron to those with similar ideological or social frames.  
109 Edgar Z. Friedenberg, “A Violent Country,” The New York Review of Books, October 20, 
1966, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1966/oct/20/a-violent-country/.=, 3. 
 19 
                                            
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 20 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on white supremacy takes many different forms. While no 
one particular category stands out, studies and information are available across a 
wide variety of disciplines. The literature can be divided into six specific groups, 
some of which encompass multiple types of literature from varied sources, 
including law enforcement agencies and watchdog groups. The categories 
addressed are as follows: psychology and SIT, ideology, religion, technology, 
recruitment, and counter radicalization.  
B. REVIEW OF AVAILABLE LITERATURE 
1. History 
The seminal work on the history of the KKK is David M. Chalmers’ Hooded 
Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan. Chalmers provides a detailed 
insight into the KKK, along with facts about the numerous rises to power and 
subsequent declines from their formation in 1865 through the late 1970s. In 
addition to the information related to formation, power struggles, and the 
concerns of society during each period, Chalmers addresses the ideologies and 
motivations for KKK leaders and members. While Chalmers does not specifically 
name SIT as his theoretical frame for understanding Klan motivations, his 
specific accounts of basic motivations mirror the foundations of the theory used 
for this research.  
While Chalmers aptly details motivations for members as in-group 
fraternalism and protectors of white American Protestant society, he also offers 
contradictions in at least one case.110 Chalmers aptly explains throughout the 
work how the KKK protects and defends societal beliefs, especially those of the 
110 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 31, 110–112, 395. 
 21 
                                            
white woman found at the heart of Southern culture.111 He also explains in detail 
the process of an individual coming to accept violence as an approved form of 
defensive action in “protection” of the American ideals as understood by the in-
group.112 In addition, Chalmers, while again not naming it as such, presents the 
cultural markers necessary for an individual to use violence as an approved 
method.113 While extensively explaining the group dynamics involved with the 
organization, Chalmers shows subtle nuances when he closes the work with an 
explanation that the organization “is an expression of—and often a solution to—
its members’ own problems of personal and social definition.”114 This explanation 
may be an indicator of an individual’s motivation for joining the KKK. However, 
this statement differs with the explanations Chalmers provides throughout the 
work that are in line with the group dynamics explained through the SIT 
framework. 
The major concern with Chalmers’ work comes into play with the third 
edition. The second edition was released in 1968 and the third in 1981. The 
updated edition includes facts and Chalmers’ analysis for the period of the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Apparently, during that time, Chalmers experienced changes in 
his personal views. His later “analysis” appears to be personal attacks on 
individuals from the Southern portion of the United States rather than objective 
scholarship. Chalmers repeatedly refers to “poor-boy politics,” the “rural-minded 
Southern working-class,” “racist” and “racism” related responses, Southern 
“Klannishness,” and the idea that the KKK cannot exist successfully outside the 
Southern United States.115 Chalmers goes so far as to state that KKK members 
find “excitement…inflicting pain,” even though he previously provided a scholarly 
111 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 21, 326. 
112 Ibid., 376. 
113 Ibid., 388. 
114 Ibid., 395. 
115 Ibid., 407, 414, 427. 
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explanation for the acceptance of violence as an approved tactic.116 Chalmers 
further claims, “The Klan is an available Southern tradition,” despite his earlier 
descriptions of the KKK’s August 8, 1925, parade in Washington D.C., where it 
“took two hours for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey unit to parade by.”117 The 
earlier adaptations of Chalmers’ work are scholarly and informative. 
Unfortunately, his later adaptation devolved primarily into clichés insulting the 
entire Southern portion of the United States, and intimating it is the only place 
extremism within the greater American society can be found, which is clearly not 
the case.  
For example, on January 22, 1997, Ricky Salyers, thought to belong to the 
KKK, was arrested in Martinton, Illinois, for weapons violations after a search of 
his residence yielded 35,000 rounds of ammunition, grenades, and assorted 
military gear. On March 26, 1997, anti-government adherent Brendon Blasz is 
arrested in Kalamazoo, Michigan, for manufacturing pipe bombs and other 
explosives, in a plot to bomb two Michigan federal buildings.118 On April 28, 
2000, white supremacist Richard Baumhammers murders six people, while on a 
racially motivated shooting spree in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.119 On April 19, 
2001, white supremacists Leo Felton and Erica Chase were arrested in Boston, 
Massachusetts for using counterfeit money.120 Authorities determined later that 
the couple, already in possession of a timing device, planned to bomb Jewish 
and minority landmarks, and assassinate Jewish and minority leaders.121 On 
April 4, 2009, white supremacist Richard Andrew Poplawski kills three police 
116 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 431, 376. 
117 Ibid., 429, 286–287. 
118 Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the 
Oklahoma City Bombing” 3. 
119 Ibid.; Martha Neil, “Lawyer Convicted, Sentenced to Death in Slaying of 6 Says His 
Schizophrenia Was Undiagnosed,” ABA Journal, September 12, 2011, http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/lawyer_convicted_sentenced_to_death_in_slaying_of_6_minorities/. 
120 Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the 
Oklahoma City Bombing.” 
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officers and wounds a fourth, during a domestic disturbance at his home in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.122 In addition, according to the ADL and Southern 
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), Klan groups are present in the Northern United 
States as well, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, West Virginia, 
New York, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.123 That said, the portions of 
Chalmers’ work stemming from the earlier additions are scholarly and provide 
useful information to explain the backdrop of the KKK in the United States.124 
2. SIT 
While the individual groups differ, similarities do appear in SIT as it relates 
to the sovereign citizen movement. Literature on these groups helps to 
understand the motivation behind white supremacy adherence and group 
participation. In his work, Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only the 
Beginning, Joel Dyer states, “More often than not, the…movement can provide 
an explanation that fits a person’s particular circumstance like a glove, and more 
important, a hurting individual can find a group of empathetic supporters who 
help him hang on.”125 The importance of Dyer’s work is that, while he does not 
reference the KKK, his observations apply to the individuals involved in that 
organization also. Applying Dyer’s research, it explains that as personal 
circumstances lead a person to feel powerless and vulnerable, the self must act 
to preserve the individual.126 Membership in the group helps the individuals 
understand they are not the failure, but rather the system has failed them.127 This 
belief allows the individuals to recapture their personal identity, which fuses with 
122 Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the 
Oklahoma City Bombing.” 
123 Ku Klux Klan Rebounds; Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map.” 
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Oklahoma City Bombing.” 
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126 Ibid., 30. 
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the collective membership of the group.128 Identity no longer ties only to the 
individual, but to the group as well. Defense of the group ideology also becomes 
defense of self. Additionally, as more time is spent with like-minded individuals, 
groupthink opens them to accept more extreme views.  
In their work The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann contend, the 
psychology of individuals produces their reality.129 “Beyond this, however, the 
reality of everyday life is ongoingly affirmed in the individual’s interaction with 
others.”130 Berger and Luckman further explain the result of this interaction is the 
institutionalization of the social construction of the group’s reality.131 Again 
applying the work to the KKK, in essence, like-minded individuals, with strong 
beliefs form the basis of the white supremacist movement. These individuals 
each bring their own reality into the organization, which meld together into the 
collective reality of the group. With the collective reality of a group, groupthink is 
more likely to occur, which leads to extremist acts considered justifiable. It is 
easy to see how a person can turn to violence in reaction to critical levels of 
stress and as groupthink takes over.  
Henry Tajfel’s Social Identity and Intergroup Relations addresses SIT in 
detail, which is the major work related to this theory. It explains in-group 
dynamics, and how individuals function within the group, along with how the in-
group functions in relation to the out-group. When applying this work to the KKK, 
one idea of major significance is that with individuals fully enmeshed in the white 
supremacist movement, their group identity functions to the exclusion of their  
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individual identity, and their new sense of self becomes based largely on 
belonging to the movement.132 As this happens, individual identity ties to the 
group identity. 
Fathali Moghaddam’s Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: 
Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context, breaks down the 
basics of SIT into the following five tenets: “identity motivation,” “centrality of 
social identity,” “assessing social identity through social comparisons,” 
“availability of cognitive alternatives,” and “strategies for improving social 
identity.”133 Moghaddam then explains each tenet, which can in turn apply to 
members of the KKK. Important to take from Moghaddam’s analysis is that 
comparisons of an individual to others determine the influence of both intergroup 
and out-group relations on that person. A positive view of the individual’s own 
group, and their position within the group, is necessary to have a continued 
positive identity of both themselves and their associations. Moghaddam provides 
an insightful breakdown of Tajfel’s work, which is useful in the application of the 
theory to individual groups and motivations for members. For instance, “identity 
motivation” explains how people seek a positive self-identity.134 “Centrality of 
social identity” explains that this need for a positive self-identity leads individuals 
to associate with groups that fulfill this need.135 “Assessing social identity through 
social comparisons” means individuals come to understand themselves by 
comparing their personal situations to those of others.136 This comparison is an 
important component of intergroup relations, or relations between different 
groups or out-groups, because it provides individuals with the ability to influence 
their social comparison based on their choice of targets with which to 
132 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 19. 
133 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 94–98. 
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compare.137 “Availability of cognitive alternatives” details how individuals must 
perceive their personal situation to be both stable and legitimate to fulfill their 
need for a positive self-identity.138 The people who are sources of influence for 
an individual, whether religious leaders, political leaders, or popular individuals 
within society, can affect this tenet.139 “Strategies for improving social identity” 
include measures individuals has available to improve their self-identity if they 
see themselves as inadequate.140 These approaches include making intragroup, 
within an individual’s personal group or in-group, comparisons, moving to a 
higher status in-group, and transforming in-group traits to positive qualities.141 
In his work, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and 
Why They Come to Destroy, Moghaddam provides and explains his “staircase to 
terrorism” analogy.142 The steps include the “ground floor,” where people have a 
self-interpretation of their individual identity, where individual feelings of relative 
deprivation adversely affect the individual.143 The “first floor” is when a person 
develops inadequate personal identity because of perceived unfair treatment.144 
The “second floor” is often indicative of dictatorships when an individual acts 
independently of the population, referred to as the “paradox of oil,” and uses 
displacement to turn personal criticisms away from themselves and toward an 
external enemy or out-group.145 On the “third floor,” individual morality is the 
foundation and peoples’ morality allows them to circumvent inhibitions and adopt 
137 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 96–97; Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, “Intergroup,” (n.d.), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intergroup. 
138 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 97. 
139 Ibid., 97–98. 
140 Ibid., 98. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and 
Why They Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 32, 43–44. 
143 Ibid., 46. 
144 Ibid., 59. 
145 Ibid., 74. 
 27 
                                            
“terrorist myths.”146 From the “fourth floor,” an individual enters a terrorist 
organization in which the methods justify the outcomes and morality justifies any 
means to obtain a goal, including killing other human beings.147 On the “fifth 
floor,” the individual conforms to the group “norms” and obeys the authority of the 
group leaders, which allows the individual to see terrorism as a viable strategy for 
achieving their goals.148  
Moghaddam’s analogy is valuable for understanding the progression of 
radicalization within the group. Further, it is useful in applying counterterrorism 
strategies to individuals and groups. Soft power is applicable to lower levels on 
the “staircase,” while hard power is applicable to higher levels where de-
radicalization efforts are not viable options. Currently, the Terrorism and 
Radicalisation Project’s (TERRA) research specialists have an interest in using 
the “staircase” model for policy development.149 TERRA, a counterterrorism 
strategy, takes “a European approach to addressing terrorism from the point of 
view of prevention and de-radicalisation.”150 
In their forthcoming work, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist 
Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners, David Brannan and Anders Strindberg 
provide a workbook for analyzing terrorist organizations, regardless of individual 
ideologies. Brannan and Strindberg use SIT to analyze groups, ideologies, and 
actions related to the contextual environment, which is necessary for determining 
the relevance of group actions or beliefs.151 While some may believe the study of 
psychology is more practical for analysis, Brannan and Strindberg aptly explain 
this field fits more appropriately with study of the individual, as opposed to the 
146 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 83–85. 
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group.152 As previously discussed with Moghaddam’s, Tajfel’s, and Berger and 
Luckmann’s work, the applications of SIT assists in understanding the necessity 
of a positive association of membership with the in-group.153 The importance of 
Brannan and Strindberg’s work is they provide an analytical framework useful in 
analyzing individual groups that uses analytical markers to assist with the 
analysis.154 These markers include “honor-shame motivations,” “challenge-
response model,” and “patron-client relationships.”155  
Brannan and Strindberg explain the “honor-shame” marker, where groups 
strive to defend their honor, as “virtually every social interaction outside the 
immediate family is seen as a contest for honor.”156 The idea of defending the 
honor of the group against any who would besmirch it flows directly into the 
“challenge-response” marker. In this model, Brannan and Strindberg identify 
three required elements, including challenge, perception, and response.157 To 
clarify, a particular group receives an initial challenge, which it must perceive as 
such that elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of defense and 
evaluation by society.158 The “patron-client” marker details the vital relationship 
of the group, wherein the larger group, as patron, protects the smaller group or 
individual as client.159 The client must reciprocate the protection of the patron in 
some form to solidify and continue the symbiotic relationship.160 The analyst 
uses these markers in direct and intimate conjunction with each other never fully 
separating the honor challenge cycle from existing patron/client relationships or 
the group’s view of Limited Good.  
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Important components of this relationship, necessary for understanding 
actions, include the relationship of the in-group with the out-group, and society’s 
perception and evaluation of the relationship, especially relative to the 
“challenge-response” actions.161 Brannan and Strindberg also point out the 
necessity of avoiding bias, including an individual’s, to produce the most vital 
analysis and avoid slanting the end product, which results in nothing useful for 
counterterrorism purposes.162  
Brad Deardorff’s, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War 
on Terrorism, uses the framework of SIT in developing a new approach to 
counterterrorism efforts in the United States. Drawing on successes and failures 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, Deardorff suggests 
implementing “Regional Outreach Coordination Centers (ROC Centers)…to 
coordinate engagement activities and tailor local approaches” in counterterrorism 
efforts.163 The importance of this idea is Deardorff suggests the necessity of SIT 
as the framework for the actions endorsed by the ROC Center. He argues that 
law enforcement officials engaged in the efforts focusing on the cognitive, 
evaluative, and emotional levels of SIT have a greater likelihood of successfully 
engaging the “other” and facilitating recategorization, decategorization, or cross-
categorization across differing groups normally seen in opposition.164 To explain, 
sustained engagement between groups normally seen in opposition necessarily 
engages individuals on a cognitive and an emotional level, as well as encourages 
evaluation of differing perspectives during discussion. The prolonged contact 
creates exposure to members of the out-group, which allows differing groups to 
interact and create new in-groups based on shared experiences. Ongoing 
interaction permits the possibility of seeing the “other” in a different light, and the 
increased ability to alter how the “other” is placed in a particular category. This 
161 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 40. 
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viewpoint provides an individual the opportunity to place the “other” in a different 
group than originally believed (recategorization), the chance to see the “other” 
may not fall into a previously held stereotype (decategorization), or the 
opportunity to see the possibility of mutually beneficial experiences (cross-
categorization). Deardorff explains, “…ideologies, therefore, are best countered 
by creating experiences that conflict with preconceived stereotypes and the 
opponent’s narrative.”165 
Deardorff’s work calls for an overarching national strategy on countering 
violent extremism, and he advocates implementation at the local level by having 
law enforcement agencies embrace the idea of community policing.166 
Throughout the work, Deardorff’s experience with primarily federal 
counterterrorism efforts is obvious, but he does acknowledge that many local 
agencies have embraced this policing model for years, while some lack the 
resources to engage the community fully.167 He explains that what many local 
agencies call community policing is nothing more than community relations in the 
form of outreach programs.168 Deardorff wisely explains the community policing 
efforts he advocates come with political risk and require great levels of 
understanding of not only the community, but the targeted group as well.169 
Deardorff’s work focuses on interactions with the American Muslim community 
and a counterterrorism effort related to the Salafi-jihadi narrative, but has the 
potential to be applicable to many different types of organizations.170 His work is 
thorough and academically sound, while also backed by practical field 
experience. In addition to the vast amount of research he did, Deardorff included  
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primary sources in his work, although was unable to identify the individuals 
specifically. It would be beneficial to see more references to his primary source 
work supplementing his academic research. 
As with all the aforementioned contributions related to SIT, vital to 
understanding any relationship is the individuals’ self-perceived positive 
identification with any number of groups, along with the increased positive self-
perception of membership within a particular group, and the relationship of the in-
group versus, or with, that of the perceived “other,” or out-group. These 
components, taken together, assist with analysis and understanding of any 
individual group, terrorist or non-terrorist. Further, they assist with understanding 
the actions of any group within the context they are precipitated. Herein lies the 
vital importance of using SIT in the application of any counterterrorism policy. 
According to Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, “If you know the enemy and know 
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”171 
3. Ideology 
In his work, Psychology of Terrorism, Randy Borum suggests the following 
requirements exist related to ideology, which help explain white supremacist 
ideology. Ideology provides an unquestionable belief system that directs behavior 
toward a specific goal that serves a worthwhile cause.172 This belief is an 
important consideration, in conjunction with SIT, to explain the acceptance of 
belief systems society in general considers taboo. 
Most of the information about specific group ideology stems from literature 
produced by watchdog groups, such as the ADL and SPLC.173 While these 
groups spend considerable resources investigating hate groups, the resulting 
171 Sun Tzu and Lionel Giles, The Art of War (Start Publishing LLC, 2013), Kindle edition, loc 
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literature comes from a potentially biased perspective. In her article, “Purity is 
Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities,” Anna Simons explains the ADL 
and SPLC “track and condemn any group they suspect is separatist or 
supremacist, augmenting whatever surveillance government agencies may 
already be conducting.”174 This behavior hardly provides an academic or 
unbiased basis on which to analyze individual groups. The concern is that much 
law enforcement information stems from these particular sources without 
additional scrutiny, as opposed to law enforcement engaging in collecting primary 
source information. For example, many law enforcement bulletins specify these 
watchdog groups as source information, which leads to concerns when 
researchers fail to speak with the respective groups, but use secondary source 
information as the foundation for their literature, perspectives, or even actions 
that is evident in academic literature as well, where research products list 
watchdog groups as references for vital conclusions. While their product is 
valuable and necessary, whenever possible, researchers need to include primary 
sources to supplement the data obtained from other organizations, including the 
ADL and SPLC. 
In his article, “Right Wing Violence in North America,” Jeffrey Kaplan also 
references the stance taken by the ADL regarding right-wing groups. Kaplan, 
although referencing the watchdog group numerous times, makes the point that 
the ADL considers themselves “self-appointed” enforcers against all right-wing 
ideology, unrelenting in their pursuit of any group in their crosshairs.175 Kaplan 
appears, while using the ADL’s material extensively, to provide an academic 
analysis in his work, however. This article, in addition to Kaplan’s collaboration 
with Leonard Weinberg, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right, is 
useful in gaining insight into the historical perspective of some right-wing 
organizations, in addition to ideologies, expansion, and decline of different 
174 Anna Simons, “Purity Is Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 12, no. 3–4 (2000): 186. 
175 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Right Wing Violence in North America,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
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organizations. Further, without referencing it as such, Kaplan’s analysis of 
ideology related to terrorist violence ties directly into SIT, which is highly useful 
related to this research. 
Additionally, a blanket label for all white supremacist groups tends to be 
the norm, which simply is not an accurate or intellectually coherent way to 
describe this nuanced constellation of ideologically and action oriented diverse 
groups. No blanket ideology applies to all extreme right organizations. They are 
as individual as each group. Consider, for example, the (ABT and the AC, that 
function primarily for monetary gain and are classified as criminal gangs.176 If 
these groups function as criminal enterprises, as opposed to race-based hate 
groups, they cannot be included in a blanket white supremacist explanation. 
Further, Christian Identity groups and groups that practice pagan religions do not 
embrace the same ideology, nor do they necessarily want the same, or even a 
similar ultimate outcome.177 KKK groups, based primarily on race relations, 
cannot be lumped in with religious based organizations, although individual 
groups may combine both ideology and theology. Reuben Sawyer was the first to 
do this comparison.178 Skinhead groups do not align with KKK groups when 
exploring the underlying music culture embraced by the skinhead 
organizations.179 The examples of ideological diversity are as numerous as the 
groups and the ever-evolving actions and understanding of the events that occur 
around them. Even within a particular type of group, such as the KKK, blanket 
statements do not apply to the underlying ideology. For example, KKK leader 
Thom Robb’s efforts to rebrand his group as eschewing violence for peaceful 
176 The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate, 7; National Gang Threat Assessment: 
Emerging Trends (Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011), 31, 44, 76; 
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protests and positive group image lie outside the norm of other KKK groups.180 
Each individual group, like society in general, defines itself by the members, 
geographic location, leadership, etc. This tendency, even within the academic 
community, to lump all extreme right organizations together under one ideology, 
is a major obstacle to critical understanding within the extant literature.  
4. Religion 
Many members of these organizations subscribe to Christian Identity 
theology and Odinism. In his work, Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman provides a 
general description of Christian Identity as a white supremacist religion that 
teaches white people are “chosen” by God and Jews are children of Satan.181 
Odinism is a pagan religion originating in Northern Europe, which is a warrior-
based religion whose followers believe they will ascend to Valhalla upon 
death.182 Jeffrey Kaplan, in “Right Wing Violence in North America,” provides a 
brief description of Odinism, “a reconstruction of the Viking-era Norse pantheon,” 
which plays on cultic beliefs, and leads anti-Semitic individuals “to conclude that, 
as Christianity is built on a Jewish foundation, it too must be swept away.”183 
This pagan belief is compelling to many in the white supremacist world, 
especially younger adherents, as evidenced by AC membership in the DFW 
area.184 This research, however, focuses on a case involving a Christian Identity 
group, and Odinism is not a focus. 
The major works in the field related to Christian Identity theology include 
James Aho’s, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, and 
Michael Barkun’s, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian 
Identity Movement, both of which over-generalize the theology’s nuances and fail 
180 Kaplan, “Right Wing Violence in North America,” 49. 
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to depend on primary source research. One major departure from this tendency 
is research by David Brannan’s “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: 
Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity.” Brannan’s work details the 
individual differences of groups within Christian Identity theology, and most 
importantly, makes use of primary source material to detail the differences other 
researchers fail to explain. He provides detailed descriptions and analysis of 
Seed-Line, Non-Seed Line, Rebellious, and Repentant Christian Identity 
theologies, in addition to a history of the foundational belief of British-
Israelism.185  
Primary source material is also available from individuals formerly involved 
with the Christian Identity movement. In his work, Tabernacle of Hate: Why They 
Bombed Oklahoma City, Kerry Noble details the metamorphosis of the former 
Christian Identity based group CSA. The group began as a fundamentalist 
Christian organization called Zarephath, later transitioned to Zarephath-Horeb, 
with the group living in a commune in the Ozark Mountains on the Arkansas-
Missouri border.186 With the help of their leader, James Ellison, they morphed 
into a hard line militia group practicing Seed-Line Christian Identity theology, 
calling themselves the CSA.187 In addition to Noble’s first-hand account, Brannan 
provides, in his work, academic analysis based on primary source interviews with 
Noble himself, which again underlies the previously stated gap of the lack of 
primary source research, and critical academic analysis based on being in the 
field and engaging people with first-hand knowledge. 
5. Technology 
The main work in relation to the technological advances of white 
supremacist organizations is Adam Klein’s A Space for Hate: The White Power 
185 Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious 
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Movement’s Adaptation into Cyberspace. Klein did perform primary source 
research in that he analyzed active white supremacist websites. Again, the 
information appears biased and Klein specifically informs the reader his 
grandparents were Holocaust survivors.188 Despite this explicit hermeneutic 
frame and pre-suppositional starting point, Klein provides a look into the future of 
the white supremacist movement with his research. 
To begin, Klein suggests looking to the history of using technology for 
promotion of propaganda. The release of media promoting anti-Semitism dates 
back to Russia in the late 1800s with the release of The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion.189 Perhaps the most well known historical use of technology for 
propaganda promotion comes from Nazi Germany. Hitler created the Ministry of 
Public Enlightenment to control the release of all media, to include print, cinema, 
and radio, and ensure “the voices of a few translated into the voice of a 
nation.”190 The Ministry of Public Enlightenment distributed radios to the German 
citizens, with the goal of playing on the fears of the citizenry to gain compliance 
and support, and controlled all information disseminated over the airwaves.191 
Due to the history of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, much of Central 
Europe has federal legal restraints against hate speech and Holocaust denial.192 
With publication illegal in Germany, an increased presence on the Internet is 
originating in the United States, which leads to an increased U.S. influence in the 
worldwide white supremacist movement.193 Since First Amendment protections 
make similar laws and prosecution difficult in the United States, most production, 
188 Adam G. Klein, A Space for Hate: The White Power Movement’s Adaptation Into 
Cyberspace (Litwin Books, 2010), 26. 
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192 Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical 
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and sale of current white supremacist literature, occurs within U.S. borders.194 
An additional barrier to prosecution is the overall structure of the Internet itself, 
with multiple servers, Internet Service Providers (ISP), and Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses.195 The ramification of the growing U.S. influence on the Internet is 
that the white supremacist movement is no longer confined and localized, but 
rather globalized. For instance, the website of the Hammerskin Nation displays 
patches and flags of all chapters, both national and international.196 In addition, 
launched in 1995, Stormfront.org, currently producing internationally in multiple 
languages, was the first hate website on the Internet.197  
The literature also states the white supremacist movement has latched 
onto the fact that educated young people frequently use the Internet for social 
networking and research, and the movement now uses it to target white youth in 
higher education.198 They, like most organized groups, want only the best. To 
attract these young people, the white supremacist movement has toned down the 
hate speech and addresses current social issues.199 For example, the economic 
crisis, the election of the first black U.S. president, and the immigration debate, 
serve as building blocks to attract young, white, conservative individuals.200 
Once engaged, the movement is more likely to recruit like-minded individuals 
successfully. 
The importance of this engagement is the globalization of the white 
supremacist movement. In The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right, 
Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan detail the global connections as music 
production decreases the distance between the nations.201 Klein seconds this 
194 Weinberg and Kaplan, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right, 60. 
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issue of globalization in relation to technology decreasing the distance between 
borders as well.202 Further, Weinberg and Kaplan acknowledge that most 
literature on the subject is biased and they attempt to present their analysis in an 
unbiased manner.203 While technology and recruiting are not the focus of this 
research, it is necessary to understand the future of the white supremacist 
movement to appreciate the need to apply counterterrorism strategies to the 
individual groups. 
6. Counterterrorism Studies 
In his work, Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the 
Opportunity, Robert Deardorff suggested restructuring processes to counter 
violent extremism as it relates to Islamism by using a “balanced-power 
approach.”204 This method of combining both hard and soft power has been 
successful in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the United States, 
Deardorff suggests using the community to notify law enforcement when it 
believes an individual is susceptible or undergoing the process of radicalization. 
Moderate clerical leaders within the Muslim community can then step in to 
counsel the individual and intervene. An open and transparent relationship with 
the Muslim community can help improve its comfort levels when hard power is 
necessary, such as the active involvement of law enforcement to interrupt a 
suspected terrorist plot. Further, this relationship of trust can lead the community 
to come forward with possible radicalization within its midst, and thereby, allow 
law enforcement and religious leaders to intervene.205 The premise is to build 
bridges with the Muslim community and utilize it in to predict and prevent 
radicalization among its members. Genuine collaboration, reforms, and open 
202 Klein, A Space for Hate, 2, 17. 
203 Weinberg and Kaplan, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right, 1–2. 
204 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 119. 
205 Ibid., 119–124. 
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lines of communication have proven effective in countering radicalization and the 
decline of some organizations.206  
During the Troubles, the soft power approach proved successful, and the 
United Kingdom attempted to address Islamist terrorism following 9/11 in a 
similar fashion by embracing the Prevent Strategy, which is part of the UK’s 
CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. CONTEST is a “balanced approach that 
incorporates both hard and soft power: aggressive military action and policing to 
disrupt terrorist operations paired with engagement strategies designed to stop 
the flow of new recruits and cut off support for terrorist organizations.”207 The 
Prevent component of CONTEST builds its foundation on the expectation that 
community involvement in the prevention of terrorism is vital and expected.208 
The Prevent strategy is not without its critics, as detailed in H. A. Hellyer’s, 
Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, 
Present, and Future. It is important to consider the failures of the program when 
seeking application of the ideas to a different organization; in this case, white 
supremacists. While Prevent and Deardorff’s “balanced-power” base their 
methods on religious affiliation, white supremacists do not fall in that category. 
The models, however, have the common goal of reducing violent extremism from 
within the ranks of whatever group they target. The goal, then, is to further the 
research in the effort to apply the models and lessons learned to a different 
group for the purpose of counterterrorism efforts.  
In his article, “Confronting Terrorism,” Gregory Miller details state 
counterterrorism methods and divides down into the four response categories of 
doing nothing, conciliation, legal reform, restriction, and violence.209 Miller further 
explains that problem of ignoring the distinguishing characteristics of individual 
206 Berlet and Lyons, “Militia Nation,” 25; Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The 
Challenge and the Opportunity,” 119; Dyer, Harvest of Rage, 251. 
207 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 46. 
208 Ibid., 47. 
209 Gregory D. Miller, “Confronting Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 
(2007): 335. 
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groups, which is problematic since no one particular policy or response is 
successful for confronting all terrorist organizations.210 In Miller’s work, the most 
important conclusion for this research relates to groups Miller classifies as 
“reactionary,” which includes right-wing organizations.211 Although previously 
stating the importance of considering the motivations of individual groups, Miller 
lumps all right-wing organizations into this one category, including groups from 
around the globe. Although the analysis does not focus on individual 
characteristics, Miller asserts that legal reform is the most successful method of 
countering right-wing organizations, including targeting their financial sources, 
which he bases on previous successful civil litigation with some groups, including 
one faction of the KKK.212 Miller’s analysis does yield helpful information that 
legal reform should be part of any policy directed at countering white supremacist 
violent extremism. Kaplan’s “Right Wing Violence in North America” and Simons’ 
“Purity is Danger: An Argument for Divisible Identities” discuss counterterrorism 
strategies as well. The importance of both articles is the extensive use of SIT and 
analytical markers to explain the actions of right-wing groups. While not 
specifically named as such, both pieces discuss group solidarity and motivations 
for action. Kaplan describes actions and ideology in terms akin to Brannan and 
Strindberg’s “challenge-response” model, and Simons specifically refers to 
identity throughout the piece. The importance is SIT permeates academia’s 
discussion, but it has not specifically applied the theory to counterterrorism 
studies until Brannan and Strindberg’s work, which underscores the necessity of 
the application of SIT to successful counterterrorism policy with any terrorist 
organization within the United States. 
Ed Husain’s, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I 
Saw Inside and Why I Left, provides a primary source account of his association 
with radical Islam. While related to Islamist radicalization, rather than KKK 
210 Miller, “Confronting Terrorism,” 332–333. 
211 Ibid., 340–341. 
212 Ibid., 341. 
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affiliation, useful parallels should be considered. Husain details his recruitment 
and radicalization, along with what led him to separate from the movement. Like 
Noble’s personal account, it is not academic literature, but provides great insight 
into the mind of the individual and the necessary requirements for 
counterterrorism efforts. When drafting policy for efforts to counter violent 
extremism, the government must be willing to work with any individuals who 
renounce violence as a way to further extremist beliefs.213 
C. CONCLUSION 
Obstacles remain with addressing terrorism from traditionally right-wing 
organizations.214 Although America has seen individuals with right-wing ties 
commit acts of terror, few had the open support of a terrorist organization.215 For 
instance, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols held strong ties to the right-wing 
anti-government movement, but had neither association with, nor the open 
support of, a particular organization for their actions in the Oklahoma City 
bombing.216 In addition, the problem with addressing these belief systems is very 
little unbiased, primary source, academic literature is available relating to white 
supremacists. The gap makes it necessary to apply relevant literature in other 
disciplines to members within the movement. These outside disciplines help 
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Another major weakness is much of the available literature exhibits a 
strong bias against members of the white supremacist movement, and stems 
from information provided by watchdog groups like the ADL and the SPLC.217 
Not to belittle the efforts and valuable contributions of these groups, but primary 
source material is used limitedly in the available research, which has simply led 
to an acceptance of using “secondary data” in studies related to any terrorist 
organization.218 
In addition, little is offered about countering violent extremism within this 
sector of domestic terrorist organizations. While academic literature related to 
right-wing organizations and possible counterterrorism suggestions is available, 
the researcher did not find literature regarding what methods were used in 
countering violent extremism within these groups, nor if any methods found 
success, which is a major weakness, especially as domestic terrorism is a 
concern for the DHS and the future of the homeland security enterprise.219 
217 Jeffrey Kaplan, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right (Rutgers University 
Press,, 1998), 1–2. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The problem addressed in this research is countering violent extremism 
within the white supremacist KKK organization in Texas. Throughout its history, 
the KKK has seen multiple declines and resurgences. Since the KKK is alive and 
well in the United States, it is necessary to understand its ideology and 
motivations, and determine methods to mitigate extremist violence posed by far 
right members within the organization. Extremism will never be abolished, but it 
is necessary to counter extremist violence.  
This research addresses five important questions related to the white 
extremist issues. 
• Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
• Are there generational differences in leadership that effect 
interactions with the group? 
• Does religion influence race relations? 
• What induces participation in the group? 
• Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to 
counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
This research uses the case study method, and utilizing a holistic multiple-
case study approach, compares two separate cases involving former leaders 
who prevented, or aborted, acts of domestic terrorism from their organizations.220 
The research details the events involving each leader, along with their insights 
into the organizations, and the overall white supremacist culture. Data sources 
include literature and approved interviews with the specific leaders of a Texas 
KKK group and an Arkansas Christian Identity group, following the detailed 
methodology for human subject research, provided by the university’s 
Institutional Review Board.221 The primary goal of the interviews was to 
220 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods: 5 (Applied Social Research 
Methods), 4th ed. (Sage Publications, Inc., 2008), 59–60. 
221 Naval Postgraduate School, Research Office, “IRB Application Packages,” (n.d.), 
http://www.nps.edu/Research/IRB_Applications.htm. 
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determine if general knowledge of a specific group's ideologies provides enough 
information for law enforcement and counterterrorism leaders going forward to 
establish a process of countering violent extremism, specifically from within the 
KKK in Texas. The researcher transcribed and categorized the interviews in 
relation to the five themes in the research questions. The researcher focused on 
the reasons for each leader’s decision to interrupt, or abort, a terrorist plot to 
determine if similarities exist to make replication of these case studies 
possible.222 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Using a theoretical framework, the theory becomes a method for 
generalization of the data to similar cases.223 This framework also assists with 
focusing attention on the relevant data, and guides the data analysis process.224 
This research intends to look at the white supremacist movement through the 
lens of SIT. SIT is useful in explaining the relationship of the individual to the 
group, and how that relationship affects a person’s identity. Fathali Moghaddam 
identifies the basics of SIT in his work Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations. 
Moghaddam divides the basics of the theory into the following five tenets: 
“identity motivation,” “centrality of social identity,” “assessing social identity 
through social comparisons,” “availability of cognitive alternatives,” and 
“strategies for improving social identity.”225  
To explain what these mean before application to the research, it begins 
with the individual. The central idea of SIT is the individual desire to establish a 
distinct identity, which affects a person in a positive way.226 Individuals 
experience no benefit in establishing identities that make them feel bad about 
themselves, or reflect themselves in a negative light. Next, SIT suggests that 
222 Yin, Case Study Research, 59. 
223 Ibid., 130. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 94–98. 
226 Ibid., 94. 
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individuals, in search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will 
seek to join a group that will fulfill their emotional needs.227 The group will be of 
like-minded individuals, who bolster the new member, and increase the positive 
feelings associated with their identity.  
SIT places the most importance on this issue because the individual 
identity ties to the group membership in that it enables the individual to join the 
group.228 Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons between 
themselves and both members of the group and those outside the group.229 
These comparisons of an individual to others determine the influence of both 
intergroup and out-group relations on that individual. Individuals necessarily self-
identify as members of particular groups as part of both their personal and social 
identity.230 The group to which individuals belong and feel a positive identity is 
their in-group, and members of opposing groups or “the other,” are out-
groups.231  
Interactions between different groups constitute intergroup relations, while 
those within a particular group are intragroup relations.232 A positive view of 
individuals’ own group, as well as their position within the group, is necessary to 
have a continued positive identity of both themselves and their associations. 
Those within the group who have a superior group association will attempt to 
keep things as they are, while those members with an inferior group association 
will attempt to change things and elevate their status to improve their positive 
identity.233 As those dissatisfied members seek to improve their association, they 
227 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 95. 
228 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 21. 
229 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 96. 
230 Ibid., 100. 
231 Ibid., 101; Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A 
Handbook for Practitioners, 27. 
232 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Intergroup,” (n.d.), http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
nary/intergroup; Merriam-Webster, “Intragroup,” (n.d.), http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical 
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have some options. The individual member can move to a group with higher 
status, and therefore, more positive identity associations. If the dissatisfaction is 
a collective behavior of the group, they can respond as a group to the minority 
status and challenge the higher status group.234 
Another important consideration regarding group behavior is the notion of 
cultural markers as an analytical framework that explains the nuances of the 
behavior. Every group association has a patron and client relationship. One is 
providing and one is receiving some benefit to the symbiotic relationship. The 
“patron-client” marker details the vital relationship of the group, wherein the 
larger group, as patron, protects the smaller group or individual as client.235 The 
client must reciprocate the protection of the patron in some form to solidify and 
continue the relationship.236 Important components of this relationship, 
necessary for understanding actions, include the relationship of the in-group with 
the out-group, and society’s perception and evaluation of the relationship, 
especially relative to the “challenge-response” actions.237  
The notion of honor and shame is also important, which relates to social 
capital rather than actual currency. Without honor, a group is useless. The capital 
is a limited good and not an endless commodity, whatever that capital is for the 
particular transaction. Again, it is social capital as opposed to items of economic 
value. Brannan and Strindberg explain the “honor-shame” marker, in which 
groups strive to defend their honor, as “virtually every social interaction outside 
the immediate family is seen as a contest for honor.”238 The idea of defending 
the honor of the group against any who would besmirch it flows directly into the 
“challenge-response” marker. In this model, Brannan and Strindberg identify 
234 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 98. 
235 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 40. 
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three required elements, including challenge, perception, and response.239 To 
clarify, an initial challenge to a particular group occurs, which they must perceive 
as such, that then elicits a requirement to respond for the purpose of defense 
and evaluation by society.240 Should the group see an action as a challenge, it is 
obliged to respond. Response allows the group to avoid the loss of honor, or any 
transaction capital it defends.241 Finally, Brannan and Strindberg also emphasize 
the necessity of avoiding bias, including a person’s own, to produce the most 
vital analysis and avoid slanting the end product, which results in nothing useful 
for counterterrorism purposes.242  
B. SETTING 
This research occurred in DFW, in the state of Texas. Based on the 
interest of the researcher, this geographical location was the area of focus. 
Neither case pertains to events that occurred in DFW, but both former leaders 
are from the surrounding area and are familiar with local demographics, as well 
as white supremacist organizations within the vicinity. The interviews occurred in 
physical locations of the particular individual’s choosing. 
The former CSA Identity leader, Mr. Kerry Noble, chose his home as the 
interview location. The researcher met another individual, who verified the 
subject agreed to the intrusion, prior to receiving the exact location of the 
subject’s residence on the property. The residence was rural and the subject’s 
wife was present in the home at the time of the interview, but not in the room 
physically. The interview occurred in the subject’s home office, where the 
researcher and subject sat on opposite side of the subject’s desk. The room had 
bookshelves on three sides and a window on the wall behind the subject’s desk. 
239 Ibid., 38. 
240 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 38. 
241 Brannan and Strindberg, “The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security.”  
242 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 54. 
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All shelves and some desk corners were full of books covering a variety of 
subjects from religion to fiction. The room, immaculately clean and well ordered, 
was comfortable for the researcher and subject alike. No distractions arose and 
the welcoming environment was conducive to the interview process, which was 
uninterrupted in its entirety. 
The former KKK leader, Mr. Robert L. Spence, Jr., chose a public place as 
the location for his interview. The researcher met Mr. Spence at a McDonald’s 
restaurant in Mesquite, Texas. It was lunchtime and the group, which included 
Mr. Spence’s spouse, was at a corner table. Several other people were at the 
location, but it was not full. Despite the other people present at the location, no 
distractions arose and the interview proceeded uninterrupted. 
C. PARTICIPANTS 
The subjects involved in the research were English speaking, white males, 
both in their sixties; one was sixty-one and the other sixty-eight. They both come 
from a lower level socio-economic status, and had multiple years experience 
within their respective organizations. The researcher selected both individuals 
from the population based on their personal experiences as former leaders within 
white supremacist organizations, and their involvement in disrupted, or aborted, 
domestic terror plots aimed at igniting a racial holy war (RAHOWA).243  
Due to their former positions within their respective organizations and their 
involvement in potential domestic terror incidents, they were uniquely qualified to 
discuss themes related to the research questions. The themes included 
generational leadership and ideological differences, reasons for participation, the 
feasibility of the success of the “balanced-power” method, and effective methods 
to counter white supremacist violent extremism. The researcher compared both 
cases for similarities and common themes related to the research questions. 
 
243 RAHOWA.US, “Creativity Awake! Prepare for Survival,” (n.d.), http://www.rahowa.us/ 
index2.html. 
 50 
                                            
The researcher compared a KKK case study to a case study involving a 
former leader within the CSA. The researcher chose the CSA leader based on 
his decisions to abort a terrorist plot within his organization.244 Data sources 
related to the CSA case study came from literature and interviews. The analysis 
sought to determine patterns and causal relationships relevant to countering 
violent extremism.  
The KKK case study forming the core of the research detailed the 
decisions of a KKK leader to disrupt a terrorist plot within his organization.245 
Both cases detail a successful intervention that did not involve outside 
deterrence to prevent the specific domestic terror incident. This research 
compares the KKK case with the CSA case to determine if “balanced-power” 
may successfully counter violent extremism committed by white supremacist 
adherents.246 The purpose was to determine a potential base ideal that would 
demonstrate a successful “balanced-power” approach, and potentially lead to 
cooperation by leaders within the KKK.247 This core independent variable may be 
the one belief common among adherents, that which is taboo enough, to 
encourage betrayal of their sworn oath for protecting their brothers. 
D. MEASUREMENT 
The researcher asked each individual 14 questions detailing their thoughts 
about the themes outlined in the research questions. The questions included 
their views on religion, recruitment, leadership, law enforcement, violence, and 
collaboration efforts. The researcher matched each question to one of the five 
research categories, which allowed the researcher to determine commonalities in 
244 Katherine Bishop, “Plot Against U.S. Described In Court,” New York Times, February 28, 
1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/28/us/plot-against-us-described-in-court.html?; Noble, 
Tabernacle of Hate.” 
245 Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.” 
246 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19. 
247 Ibid. 
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answers to each question, related to the research categories. The researcher 
asked each subject the following questions. 
• How did you get involved with the organization? 
• Why did you join? 
• Why do others join? 
• What do you see as the relationship between different races? 
• Do you participate in organized religion? 
• What are your thoughts on Christian Identity? 
• How do you recruit new members? 
• Is there a difference in leadership with different generations? 
• What are your feelings toward law enforcement? 
• Would you ever trust them? 
• Does your organization condone violence? 
• Could a relationship be developed between your organization and 
law enforcement? 
• Who would need to be involved? 
• What approach would you suggest? 
Again, the researcher measured responses related to the following 
themes. 
• Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
• Are there generational differences in leadership that effect 
interactions with the group? 
• Does religion influence race relations? 
• What induces participation in the group? 
• Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to 
counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
The research questions were as follows.  
• Questions nine (9), ten (10), and eleven (11) related to theme one, 
the possibility of countering KKK violent extremism. 
• Question eight (8) related to theme two, generational leadership 
differences.  
• Questions four (4), five (5), and six (6) related to theme three, 
religious influence on race relations.  
 52 
• Questions one (1), two (2), three (3), and seven (7) related the 
theme four, group participation.  
• Questions twelve (12), thirteen (13), and fourteen (14), related to 
theme five, the possible effectiveness of “balanced-power.”  
For valid research protocols and findings, it is necessary for the 
researcher to establish construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability, related to the process, data analysis, and findings.248 Construct validity 
refers to the use and adherence to standard operational measures during the 
research process, including the identification of known gaps in the available 
literature.249 The researcher addressed construct validity by using multiple 
sources for research, including literature, interviews, and primary source 
publications. The researcher ensured the integrity during data collection by 
personally maintaining all data, including identifiers, in separate locations from 
other research materials, which were password protected and only accessible by 
the researcher. Each subject interviewed reviewed the final research products 
related to their individual case studies for verification and clarification purposes, 
prior to final submission by the researcher. Internal validity relates to the 
researcher making valid inferences when seeking causal relationships for cause 
and effect circumstances.250 To ensure inferences for cause and effect 
relationships were valid, the researcher used pattern matching in the data 
analysis to look for common themes related to both individual questions and 
overall research themes. A theoretical framework supported the results during 
the data analysis and explanation building process, as opposed to the researcher 
using personal knowledge alone to infer causal relationships. To avoid invalid 
inferences, the researcher provided rival explanations to the research findings, 
when available. External validity relates to whether findings are generalizeable to 
other cases.251 Again, for both cases, the researcher applied a theoretical 
248 Yin, Case Study Research, 40–45. 
249 Ibid., 41–42. 
250 Ibid., 42–43. 
251 Ibid., 43–44. 
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framework to the research process and findings, in addition to replicating the 
process and theory for both cases. Reliability refers to whether a research 
process is repeatable should a different researcher have similar cases and all 
available research processes.252 To ensure reliability, the researcher 
documented all procedures, interview questions, and data the same way in both 
cases. A spreadsheet served for tracking all procedures, data, and analysis for 
both cases as well. With detailed procedural documentation and data collection, 
another researcher can easily repeat the process. 
E. DATA COLLECTION 
The interviews occurred at a time and place chosen by the research 
subject, to increase the comfort level with the researcher and the process of 
providing sensitive personal information, potentially seen as taboo by society. As 
the subjects may become uncomfortable sharing their personal experiences and 
involvement with a white supremacist organization, the researcher attempted to 
accommodate the individuals during the interview process that included not only 
performing all interviews at a time and location chosen by the subject, and in the 
company of anyone the subject opted to include, but also provided all consent 
documentation prior to the interviews so subjects could review the procedures 
and obtain any needed clarification. The researcher made the subjects aware of 
reasons requiring termination of interviews, as well as ensuring subjects 
understood they could refuse or terminate the interviews at any time. Subjects 
also had the option of approving audio recording during the interview process, as 
well as the option of selecting anonymity during the entire process, including the 
final research product.  
Each interview lasted between one and two hours, and was audio 
recorded with the permission of the subject. The researcher provided all subjects 
a consent release prior to the interview for the purpose of review, which allowed 
time to answer any questions that might arise. At the beginning of the initial 
252 Yin, Case Study Research, 45. 
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interviews, the researcher obtained signed consent forms and covered topics 
including anonymity and the use of quotes attributed to the individual. Upon the 
conclusion of the research, the individual subjects reviewed and approved any 
direct quotes, and any information attributed directly to them, prior to inclusion in 
the final research product. The researcher de-identified, as needed, all notes, 
recordings, transcripts, and documentation related to the interviews, and 
provided all information to the university’s Institutional Review Board for storage. 
F. DATA ANALYSIS 
After collection, the researcher organized data obtained from the individual 
case studies in relation to the research questions. The researcher matched 
individual interview questions to specific research questions. The researcher 
matched any additional data that emerged to the research questions as well. As 
a theoretical framework, the researcher applied SIT to the specific research 
questions and additional emergent themes obtained during the interview process 
to allow for the categorization of similar themes and ideologies that emerged 
during the research process. The researcher also used specific quotes to assist 
in illustrating the individual themes that emerged related to the research 
questions. 
The researcher coded the interview questions both individually, and 
related to the five research themes. For case comparison, the researcher created 
a Word table for each individual question, as well as for each research 
category.253 This table made it possible to determine cross-case similarities and 
patterns more easily. While the analytical method relies on the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data, the method is analogous to cross-experiment 
interpretation methods using quantitative data.254 
253 Yin, Case Study Research, 160. 
254 Ibid. 
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V. KKK CASE STUDY 
On April 22, 1997, authorities arrested Shawn and Catherine Adams and 
Edward Taylor, Jr. for conspiracy to bomb a natural gas processing plant owned 
by Mitchell Energy & Development Corp., located in Wise County, Texas, 90 
minutes northwest of Dallas. The bombing was to divert attention from an 
armored car robbery, which they believed carried two million dollars.255 Carl Jay 
Waskom, Jr., arrested later, also participated in the conspiracy.256 The four also 
had plans to detonate a secondary device aimed at first responders arriving at 
the initial explosion.257 In the ensuing tragedy of two explosions, the foursome 
felt they could complete the robbery unimpeded.258 Depending on the source, 
the plans for the proceeds differ and the foursome intended to either ignite a long 
awaited racial holy war, or start a war with the U.S. government.259  
Little is available via open sources regarding what the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) coined “Operation Sour Gas.”260 What literature that is 
available details the operation as a several week investigation, which originated 
with the tip from a witness to the planning operations.261 Several sources 
identify, although not corroborated by the FBI, the informant as Robert Leslie 
Spence, Jr., Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the leader 
255 Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the 
Oklahoma City Bombing”; Wallace, “Neighbors Wary After Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas 
Processing Plant”; Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; “Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus 
the Klan, Part 5.” 
256 Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; Blejwas, Griggs, and Potok, “Almost 60 Terrorist Plots 
Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing”; Wallace, “Neighbors Wary After 
Learning of Bomb Plot Targeting Gas Processing Plant”; Poverty Law Center, “Terror from the 
Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City.” 
257 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5.” 
258 Ibid. 
259 Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, 
Part 5”; Spence, interview.  
260 Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, 
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People Held in Texas Bomb Plot.”  
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of the foursome’s Klavern.262 While some sources provide a harsh view of 
Spence, or offer information he refutes, others provide a factual reporting of the 
circumstances. According to the SPLC in, Terror from the Right: 75 Plots: 
Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City, and “Almost 60 
Terrorist Plots Uncovered in the U.S. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing,” 
Spence entered the federal witness protection program, which is not the case.263 
The SPLC sources also state that Spence was originally a co-conspirator who 
got cold feet and turned in his accomplices to the authorities, which he refutes.264 
Christine Biederman, in her Texas Monthly article, “Ku Klux Klowns,” accurately 
explains that Spence declined to enter the witness protection program and that 
Spence originally contacted authorities in March 1997 upon learning the details 
of the foursome’s plans.265 Biederman’s article, based on primary source 
interviews, provides more facts than the information produced by the ADL and 
the SPLC, although in a potentially insulting manner. The New York Times and 
Texas News presented factual articles based on the FBI’s reporting of events, 
which do not name Spence directly, but simply refer to an “informant.”266 In his 
262 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist 
Rampages Since Oklahoma City,” 9; Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns”; ADL, “Poisoning the Web—
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Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns” (PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 20–21; 
Mohammed M. Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 
Phase II (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2012), 20; Mike Malloy, “April 
(Gun) Showers,” Huff Post Politics, March 30, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-
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work, Why They Just Can’t Get Over It: A Spiritual and Psychological Approach 
to Overcoming Racism in America, Kenneth Skelton applauds Spence for “not 
being totally taken over by hatred and working with the F.B.I. to ruin these 
plans.”267 
Two academic papers reference “Operation Sour Gas” in discussing acts 
of domestic terrorism. Major Paul Brister, in his work, Ku Klux Rising: Toward an 
Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns, states had Spence 
not “gotten cold feet,” the plan may have succeeded.268 This statement 
references its informational source as the SPLC’s Terror from the Right: 75 Plots, 
Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City.269 Spence refutes this 
claim, stating he was never involved in the plot as a co-conspirator, but rather as 
an FBI informant.270 Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase II, 
written by Mohammed Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, also discusses “Operation 
Sour Gas,” stating the plan would never have succeeded because the leader of 
the plot, who they named as Spence, was an informant for the FBI all along.271 
According to Spence, this specific claim is accurate, although he refutes their 
references to him as a conspirator in the group.272  
According to available sources, Spence learned of the plans to rob a drug 
dealer for funds to build a bomb.273 The bomb was to blow up the Mitchell 
Energy & Development Corporation’s natural gas processing plant in Wise 
County, Texas.274 The explosion was a diversionary tactic to distract first 
267 Skelton, Why They Just Can’t Get Over It, 68–69. 
268 Brister, “Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist 
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responders from an armored car robbery, the proceeds of which would finance a 
war against the U.S. government.275 Spence, the Imperial Wizard of the True 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, learned of his follower’s intentions and went to the 
federal authorities with the details of the foursome’s plans.276 No one was 
suitable to place inside the KKK organization, and Spence, already an informant, 
agreed to work with the FBI during the investigation, which led to the arrest and 
conviction of all four co-conspirators.277  
The following information is Robert “Bob” Spence’s firsthand account of 
the events surrounding “Operation Sour Gas” and his involvement with the KKK, 
as related in a personal interview with the researcher on Thursday, September 5, 
2013. 
When Spence was six years old, his grandfather was a Klavern leader in 
McLennan County, Texas. Spence discovered the affiliation when he recognized 
his grandfather’s boots as the group marched to a meeting and cross lighting 
ceremony. After that, Spence accompanied his grandfather to Klavern meetings. 
The KKK was a Spence family tradition, and they trace their lineage back to the 
original founders in Pulaski, Tennessee. From the age of 11 to 18, Spence, living 
with his grandfather, was not involved in the movement. While in the military, 
Spence met Tom Metzger in California and became active in the movement once 
again. Spence attended meetings in his Marine barracks in California.278 
Although Spence joined the KKK as a family tradition, many join to avoid 
paying taxes and because they do not trust the federal government. “Some 
people join just because they want a sense of belonging somewhere.” In 
addition, the meetings are family oriented and out of respect for the women and 
children present, Klaverns forbid drugs and alcohol in the meetings. This family 
orientation also feeds a desire in some to join for that “sense of having a family.” 
275 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Versus the Klan, Part 5”; Spence, interview. 
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Most of the membership is not violent, nor do they want to participate in the cells 
Louis Beam encouraged his fellow Klansmen to form in a technique he called 
“leaderless resistance.”279 
When a cell forms within a Klavern, the leadership is aware of individuals 
spending more time together, but they are not privy to the information exchange 
within the cell. The cells are small, secretive, and careful which members they 
allow to join. This method, while the largest threat from the KKK, is effective at 
protecting not only the cell members, but the KKK leadership as well. The 
leadership also does not press members for further information, mainly from fear 
of prosecution under federal organized crime laws, or the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO).280 When asked if RICO was the main 
reason for leaders to disavow violence, Spence responded, “pretty much,” which 
leads to the KKK’s stance that the organization does not condone violence, 
although individual members may. According to fellow Klansman Beam, “What I 
don’t know can’t hurt me.”281 
Spence emphasizes the violence seen in the movement was not indicative 
of his grandfather’s Klan. As a young boy, he saw his grandfather feed poor 
blacks, despite having little himself. Seeing people willing to kill others based on 
their skin color disappointed Spence and led him to volunteer his services as a 
confidential informant for the FBI. Spence was, in fact, an FBI informant during 
the time he learned of the plot in Wise County.282 
In 1997, Spence was the Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan.283 During that time his organization had a cell whose members 
included Eddie Taylor, Jay Waskom, and Catherine and Shawn Adams. The 
279 Spence, interview. 
280 U.S. Department of Justice, “USAM 9-110.000 Organized Crime and Racketeering,” 
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Adams couple also had a son involved in the discussions, but who was not 
allowed to participate in their plans. Taylor, not knowing their leader was a long 
time FBI informant, asked Spence to join the group as they planned to bomb 
Mitchell Energy in Wise County. After contacting the FBI, and determining no 
suitable candidates were available to infiltration the organization in an 
undercover capacity, Spence agreed to work with the cell. Although some 
sources claim Spence was a co-conspirator who was too afraid to follow through 
with the attack, Spence corrects that information and explains he was never 
involved in the operation as anything other than an informant.284 
Taylor, who previously worked at Mitchell Energy, told the group 
approximately six sour gas tanks were on site at the facility. Sour gas forms a 
cloud only dispersed by heavy rainstorms, and given the estimated amount of 
sour gas present, the cloud would span a distance of around 50 square miles, 
which would kill everything in its path. Depending on the wind direction at the 
time of the explosion, the FBI felt the cloud could reach the DFW Metroplex, 
causing untold deaths. The group planned to plant one bomb by the front 
entrance and five or six more inside the refinery by the tanks. The single device 
by the entrance was a distraction device intended for law enforcement personnel 
initially responding to the location. Plans were to have it wired with a mercury 
switch that would trigger the device if any movement was detected. The group’s 
intent was to eliminate any first responders distracted by the device. To purchase 
materials for the bombs, the group planned to murder a drug dealer and his 
family, and take his money.285 
The ultimate goal of the attack, however, was not the energy plant, but 
rather obtaining enough money to finance a war. Taylor said he was watching a 
Loomis armored truck on its routes and claimed some unidentified Wise County 
Sheriff’s deputies were part of the plan. Knowing that the armed guards working 
on the trucks were willing to defend themselves and their assets, the group 
284 Spence, interview. 
285 Ibid. 
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planned to ambush the guards on their route. Taylor claimed the truck held over 
four million dollars, part of which would move all the co-conspirators to different 
locations. The remaining proceeds were for the purchase of weapons and 
explosives, because Taylor “was going after the government.”286 
Even though Mitchell Energy was not the main objective of the operation, 
the group wanted to eliminate Wise County, despite knowing Taylor’s wife and 
daughter were there. The group was focused on going to war with the U.S. 
government and cared nothing of their potential victims whom they knew were 
innocent in the cause. Catherine Adams, a mother, pointed out a daycare facility 
about 50 yards outside the front fence. She told the group, “Well, there’s a 
daycare center over there. I hate to be that way, but if that’s the way it has to be, 
that’s the way it has to be.” The FBI arrested the four cell members and although 
Spence is somewhat bitter about how the arrest happened, he would not change 
his decisions because they saved lives.287 
Some sources state the group intended to ignite a race war; however, 
Spence claims the ideology is not about race, but rather the U.S. government.288 
The KKK feels the government mistreats minorities by allowing them only the 
power the government wants them to wield. Although the KKK has a reputation 
of race-based hatred, Spence says they hate the federal government more. 
Historically, blacks have taken third place on the list of those the KKK dislikes, 
preceded by the federal government and Catholics at one time. Since Jews 
made a better target, they replaced Catholics on the list. An underlying fear of 
prosecution for activities considered hate crimes also exists. For this reason, 
leadership rarely speaks out condoning racial hatred even though they may have 
race-based prejudices, and minorities remain further down the list of those the 
KKK dislikes. The number one out-group or enemy on the list has not changed 
286 Spence, interview. 
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since the formation of the KKK following the American Civil War. “It’s got nothing 
to do with hatred. It’s got to do with knowing who the enemy is. To the Klan, the 
enemy is the federal government, period.”289  
However, since the election of President Barak Obama, the country’s first 
black president, Spence says the KKK’s numbers have grown and the movement 
is stronger. He estimates present day KKK membership at around forty 
thousand. Interestingly, Spence addresses the typical estimated membership of 
five thousand touted throughout the literature. He claims watchdog organizations 
use the active recruiting members, who openly speak out at rallies and recruiting 
events, as the base line figure of approximately two thousand five hundred. 
Then, the watchdog groups determine if that many are visibly active; about the 
same number are likely active but not seen, leading to the estimated membership 
figure they provide of five to six thousand.290 In reality, Spence claims, the 
membership numbers in Texas alone are at least that large, and he states the 
visible members are actually a very limited portion of the active Klan 
membership. To grow the membership, the KKK holds rallies and talks to the 
people. It passes out flyers and hands out literature explaining its views and the 
organization. While word of mouth recruiting has historically been the best way to 
spread the word, the KKK now has the Internet, which is a valuable recruiting 
tool. These visible members are the recruiters used for baseline numerical 
estimates. By far, however, the best recruiting tool is the membership. Having 
new and active members seek out their friends and family is the best way to 
increase the size of the organization.291 
Despite the anti-government rhetoric, Spence says he strongly supports 
local law enforcement, and has done so openly at KKK rallies. He claims his 
personal views are not completely anti-government, and he sees local police as 
defenders of the family, which is a foundational belief for the Klan. While the 
289 Spence, interview. 
290 Ku Klux Klan Rebounds, 2. 
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organization accepts law enforcement into their membership, those members are 
not privy to information that increases the Klavern’s vulnerability. The Sheriff, 
however, is different. White supremacist adherents openly recognize the 
authority of the Sheriff, as they are officials elected by the people. Other law 
enforcement officers have no authority in the eyes of the movement. Personally, 
even though Spence openly supports local law enforcement in addition to the 
Sheriff, he admits he does not trust them. Only those individuals he knows 
individually and has a relationship with, even though they are officers, are 
trustworthy in his eyes.292  
For counterterrorism efforts however, Spence feels the only viable options 
are undercover law enforcement infiltration of the KKK, or development of a 
confidential informant within the ranks of the organization. He advocates for the 
confidential informant method for the greatest chance of success. With this 
approach, Spence suggests targeting leadership for involvement. He claims it is 
more likely to be supportive of the family values and patriotism espoused by the 
Klan. Further, it is not normally involved in small cell operations and has no stake 
in the protection of the cell. Due to the fear of RICO, it has maintained its 
distance from trouble within the Klavern. The only way to accomplish this 
relationship is through honesty and support of the group ideology of family and 
country. Religion does not play a large part in the KKK ideology, but the 
members are proud of their love of country and kin, so law enforcement needs to 
use that to its advantage. Spence cautions all contact should be between only 
the officer and targeted individual to protect both parties, which includes not 
contacting an individual in front of the family.293 
While not currently active in the KKK, Spence admits he maintains much 
of the same beliefs held by the organization. He does not entirely trust the federal 
government and experiences frustration at the terrorist label placed on those 
involved in the white power movement, most of whom are not violent despite 
292 Spence, interview. 
293 Ibid. 
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media depictions to the contrary. Spence further admits he does not condone 
interracial and homosexual relationships. He has strong family values and love of 
country since he served in the U.S. Marine Corp. Spence agrees with the 
overarching ideology of the Klan, although not the violence from individual 
members, and has the following to say in defense of the movement. 
To the majority of white supremacists, it’s about family. It’s about 
honor. It’s about rights. It’s about the federal government keeping 
their nose out of their business. It’s about less taxation. It’s about 
keeping foreigners out of this country. If you’re black and want to 
join the NAACP, that’s fine. But if you’re white and you join the 
Klan, you’re a terrorist. That’s wrong.294 
294 Spence, interview. 
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VI. CSA CASE STUDY 
The history and events surrounding the CSA are widely publicized. It is not 
only in news stories and unclassified FBI documents, but also in the published 
works of Kerry Noble’s, Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City, 
and retired FBI agent Danny O. Coulson’s, No Heroes: Inside the FBI’s Secret 
Counter-Terror Force. The CSA, led by James Dennis Ellison, was in the Ozark 
Mountains of Arkansas.295 Originally called “Zarephath,” the group started as a 
religious commune to which individuals moved to raise their families in a close-
knit community dedicated to worshiping the Lord.296 In 1978, the group moved to 
a two hundred twenty-four acre property they purchased, which they called 
“Zarephath-Horeb Community Church.”297 Kerry and Kay Noble visited friends in 
the original “Zarephath” community in May 1977 for vacation, visitation, and the 
birth of their second child.298 After bonding with Jim Ellison, the Nobles remained 
at the commune until its downfall. 
During the evolution of the organization, Ellison took the group from one 
belief to another, based on religious ideology. When Noble arrived, Ellison 
preached the doctrines of “Sonship” and “Five-Fold Ministry,” which Noble 
believed were false doctrines based on his religious education.299 “Sonship” 
teaches that Jesus is the “Head of the Christ Body” and other people comprise 
the body, all of whom will ascend to Heaven in the same state of perfection as 
Jesus.300 The doctrine of “Sonship” thus states the people composing the mortal 
295 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate,” 29, 25. 
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body of Christ are sons as well, and incapable of sin.301 The doctrine of “Five-
Fold Ministry” stated that apostles and prophets continued to exist in the modern 
church and were necessary “for the perfecting of the saints into sonship.”302 
Despite his concerns about Ellison’s teachings, Noble bonded with the 
charismatic leader and committed himself to the man whose teachings he 
disagreed with, but who allowed and encouraged Noble to express his own 
beliefs in differing doctrines.303 This kinship allowed Ellison to take his followers 
down an even darker path in the years to come. 
Ellison encouraged Noble to hear Same Fife preach in Lubbock, Texas.304 
When he did, Fife pointed out Bible verses explaining “Sonship” and preached on 
the meaning of the belief, which allowed Noble to embrace the teaching.305 
Noble no longer openly disagreed with Ellison’s teachings, and he became more 
drawn to the leader and eager to learn more from him.306 The bond between the 
two men deepened and their Zarephath-Horeb Community Church grew as 
well.307 It was at this location that the followers believed Christians would find a 
place of respite safe from the government when the time of judgment arrived, 
which Ellison felt was drawing near.308 To protect the community, the residents 
destroyed links to their pasts, such as photographs, and sold personal valuables 
to raise funds for the purchase of weapons, which they found empowering.309 
Lack of exposure to outside influences in the form of radio, television, and 
newspapers was also the new norm within the community.310 This lack gave 
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Ellison even greater power in that he now controlled all messages his followers 
received, rather than only their religious education. The group increasingly 
focused on the protection of Christians, spent $52,000 on weapons, ammunition, 
and equipment between August 1978 and December 1979.311 These purchases 
allowed it to train and morph into “Christian survivalists” as it prepared to be the 
saviors of American Christians.312 The Christian commune became the base of 
operations for a patriot militia group founded in religious ideology, which operated 
under the control of “General” Ellison.313 According to Noble, the three things 
necessary for the creation of an extremist group were driving the Zarephath-
Horeb Community, including an ideology built upon false premises of despair and 
the coming judgment, the manipulation of a charismatic leader, and isolation from 
the outside world.314 
As the group prepared for the anticipated downfall of American civilization, 
Ellison introduced them to the teachings of Pastor Dan Gayman, a principal 
advocate of and author on Christian Identity theology, which adheres to the belief 
that Anglo Saxons are the true Israel.315 The seed-line doctrine of the Christian 
Identity religion teaches that true Israel descends from the union between Adam 
and Eve, while the Jews descend from the union of Eve and the Devil.316 Ellison 
preached the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), led by the Jews, had 
declared war on white America, and trampled the values espoused in America’s 
founding documents, the Declaration of Independence, and the U.S. 
Constitution.317 In 1979, Ellison inspired the group with the patriotic message, its 
purpose changed, and it, encouraged by Ellison, succumbed to the seductive 
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poison of Christian Identity theology.318 According to Noble, “The enemy’s face 
now began to take shape…Now we were no longer just Christian Survivalists, we 
were white supremacists!”319  
In his book, Tabernacle of Hate, Noble aptly, although unknowingly, 
explains the seduction of the now cult-like organization within the framework of 
SIT.  
A person’s mind is controlled once his identity, beliefs, behavior, 
thinking and emotions are replaced with a new identity. This new 
identity is the one which the original would strongly object to, if it 
knew in advance what was in store. For the core members of the 
group, if Zarephath had been in 1977 like it was in 1980, none of us 
would have moved there.320 
In 1981, this new group identity enabled the organization to leave behind the 
Zarephath-Horeb Community Church, and become the CSA.321 According to 
Ellison, the name better described the covenant between the group and God that 
they would act as the strong arm of the Lord to bring justice and judgment to 
America.322 Not only did the military training continue, but the group also hosted 
the CSA National Convocation, with the goal in mind of uniting right-wing 
extremist organizations from around the country into one unified group, led by 
Ellison.323 
In 1983, Ellison declared he had been found to be “perfect and that God 
had made him king” and took to calling himself, “King James of the Ozarks.”324 
Add to the leader’s inflated self-view the death of Identity adherent and tax 
protestor Gordon Kahl, seen by many on the far right as a martyr, and the time 
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for war was at hand.325 Ellison had continually predicted the beginning of the 
war, which had yet to come, and to save face with his followers, Ellison had to 
start the war.326 Kahl’s death in Arkansas served as the battle cry for the far 
right, and offered Ellison the opportunity he needed to protect his reputation.327 
Several failed plans later, desperate to secure his place in Ellison’s “kingdom” 
and elevate himself in the leader’s eyes, Noble volunteered to start the war 
himself.328 Noble’s path toward what would have been the largest act of 
domestic terrorism in the United States up to that time had begun.329 
On June 23, 1984, Noble originally planned to shoot and kill as many as 
possible at a park in Kansas City, Missouri, known as a meeting spot for 
homosexual activity, and bomb an adult bookstore using a briefcase full of C-4 
explosives and dynamite.330 Neither plan worked. Noble and his associate 
changed targets to the Metropolitan Community Church, which was a gay church 
in Kansas City.331 On the morning of Sunday, June 24, 1984, the two went to the 
church expecting to find a scene of debauchery and sat with the bomb placed 
under the pew beneath them.332 While waiting to set the timer for detonation, 
Noble had the opportunity to contemplate the people around him and the 
potential consequences of his actions.333 Seeing people that looked no different, 
displaying an honest expression of reaching out to God, Noble realized they 
likely had the same struggles and similarly asked God to relieve the inner turmoil 
of not having a place in society, with which he indentified.334 At that moment, 
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326 “Highway to Hate,” Dangerous Persuasions. 
327 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 133. 
328 Ibid., 145; “Highway to Hate,” Dangerous Persuasions.” 
329 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 146. 
330 “Highway to Hate,” Dangerous Persuasions; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 145–146. 
331 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 146. 
332 “Highway to Hate,” Dangerous Persuasions. 
333 Ibid.; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 146–147. 
334 “Highway to Hate,” Dangerous Persuasions. 
 71 
                                            
Noble stated, “For me it was over. All I wanted to do was hold Kay.”335 Noble told 
his associate they were done, picked up the bomb, and the two left the church to 
return to Ellison.336 
Ellison was upset, as he believed Noble’s successful attack would have 
cemented Ellison’s reputation with not only his followers but with the nobility of 
the far right as well.337 In addition, this attack would have secured Ellison’s 
reputation with the CSA National Convocation, which attracted right-wing groups 
and leaders from across the country. The group associated with convicted 
murderer Richard Wayne Snell and harbored members of the Order, also known 
as Bruders Schweigen, a right-wing terrorist organization that committed crimes 
to finance a war against the United States.338 During this time, Ellison became 
involved in a dispute with the government over CSA property and the group 
embraced the sovereign citizen rhetoric of common law and paper terrorism 
tactics.339 The group successfully protected the property and Ellison reached 
hero status within the organization.340  
In the early morning hours of April 19, 1985, the FBI’s elite Hostage 
Rescue Team (HRT), led by Agent Danny O. Coulson, surrounded the CSA 
compound to serve federal warrants for the arrest of Ellison and a search of the 
compound.341 At the time, April 19, Patriot’s Day, meant little, but is now an 
important date in the world of the far right following the siege on the Branch 
Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas, the execution of white supremacist 
Richard Wayne Snell in Arkansas, and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
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Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.342 The CSA standoff lasted four 
days and on Monday, April 22, 1985, James Ellison and his followers 
surrendered to federal authorities.343 The FBI spent several days searching the 
property and questioning the residents before arresting Noble on Friday, May 31, 
1985, for weapons violations.344  
On September 4, 1985, Noble was sentenced to five years in federal 
prison for conspiracy to possess unregistered weapons.345 Noble served his 
sentence in several facilities, and was paroled on Friday, July 31, 1987, after 
refusing admittance into the Witness Protection/Relocation Program.346 After 
years of odd jobs and writing his memoir, Noble has spent the time since his 
release educating others and striving to prevent them from taking the path of 
hate and violence he travelled.347  
All information that follows is Noble’s personal account of his involvement 
in the CSA, and his actions at the Metropolitan Community Church in Kansas 
City, Missouri, as related by Noble in an interview with the researcher on 
Wednesday, August 14, 2013, at his home. 
Kerry and Kay Noble visited the community and loved the location and 
people. They opted to remain with their friends and the chance to be part of a 
communal living arrangement, that in the beginning was pacifist and Christian 
oriented. Guns and racism were not part of the community they joined. In the 
beginning, they loved enjoying the fellowship of others with a common goal. 
Noble said that with community living, the normal walls individuals build around 
themselves naturally surround the group instead. “You become self-identified  
 
342 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 9; Coulson and Shannon, No Heroes, 254. 
343 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 171. 
344 Ibid., 172–175. 
345 Ibid., 181–182. 
346 Ibid., 193. 
347 Ibid., 200. 
 73 
                                            
with each other, with the group.” “You’ve taken how you would be with society 
and transferred that to the collective.” The group grows together and reaches a 
point at which it feels it would “die” to protect one another.348 
People join these organizations for a variety of reasons. Some have 
nothing else, but most have an internal desire to join with others. As society 
focuses more on individual accomplishments in some people, a greater need to 
be part of a community develops. “Most people just want something real.” “Really 
the root of it is people just want to belong to something that is bigger than 
themselves.” Community living pulls the group together even more than regular 
associations experienced by many groups in society. One problem with 
communal living is the joining of assets, which is a “trap within itself.” It can work, 
but the entire group needs to reach an agreement together on joining assets, and 
if so, how. CSA failed in this respect and did not take advantage of individual 
talents within the organization, nor did it provide individuals compensation for 
their labor.349 
Growing the membership differs with each group. For instance, some 
advertise in publications with similar interests. Some recruit and others reach out 
to friends and acquaintances the group may interest. Some groups target 
attractions at which people with similar interests gather, but not all groups recruit 
because some want to remain small. Largely with religious groups, they feel God 
will handle whether the group expands or not.350 
A combination of a small community isolated from society, and residents 
with no discretionary funds for family, isolated the group even more. With 
religious organizations like the CSA, societal norms are also taboo. In other 
words, family activities outside the community were unacceptable regardless of 
the lack of money within an individual family. Since families had no extra money 




                                            
and the local customs were taboo, fewer and fewer individual liberties existed 
within the group. Religion was the focus, and the CSA embraced Christian 
Identity theology.351 
In retrospect, Noble states, “It’s a joke,” when asked about Christian 
Identity. He wonders, “How could we believe that?” Consider also, not only was 
the CSA an isolated community, no Internet was available nor was exposure to 
outside ideas for the members. In addition, the religion was deceptive enough 
that it allowed them to discuss things they already believed, and they relied on 
different scriptures to explain things they struggled to understand, which added to 
what they already believed and naturally became an addition to their core beliefs. 
Identity answered enough questions to support its validity. Noble now questions 
how people continue to practice Identity with research available to refute the core 
beliefs. Perhaps, it is not that people truly believe the message, but rather it 
validates their actions. Although the Nobles miss the community and remain 
devout Christians, they now find organized religion too confining. “People are 
hungry for answers.” However, “organized religion is…typically one man telling 
everybody else what to believe.” Noble ponders that maybe the lack of thought 
and communication is based on fear or ignorance.352 
Although no longer his belief, during his time with the CSA, Noble did 
believe in a religious justification for race relations. Specifically, he “believed the 
white race was the only race that came from Adam and Eve.” “The other races 
were either mixed or pre-Adamic.” This belief was not a real problem for Noble, 
despite having had black friends prior to joining the CSA. He did not object to the 
seed line teachings of Identity either. Noble did struggle with seeing his former 
black friends as merely servants and slaves, but he had “never known any Jews, 
so it was easy to stereotype them.” Theologically Noble understood Identity 
enough to accept the dynamics of race relations with little internal conflict. 
Initially, the group refuted Identity as a theology based solely on hate, but after 
351 Noble, interview. 
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meeting Dan Gayman, and looking at Identity from a political perspective, the 
group embraced the theology because they loved America, considered 
themselves patriotic, and saw those traits as central to Identity. When reflecting 
on his journey, Noble stated, “It took me two years to learn to hate and separate 
races. It took me nine years to unlearn to hate and to put the races back 
together.”353 
The introduction of Identity was not the beginning of the evolution to 
violence, however. Since the group was apocalyptic in nature, it believed the 
latter days of man were approaching, and believed in the idea of a one-world 
government and the antichrist as part of the end times. The CSA also believed 
that all people would endure the trials of the latter days, rather than only non-
Christians. It was their duty to protect themselves and other Christian patriots 
during the end times. In 1978, through the teachings of John Todd, the CSA 
decided they needed guns to protect themselves, where before they believed 
God would protect them. Todd’s teachings resonated with the group, who felt 
guns made sense from a purely defensive standpoint. Although the group was 
converting weapons and making hand grenades, they had these items as part of 
an arsenal that allowed them to defend themselves in the event of an attack. The 
death of Gordon Kahl changed all that.354 
When Gordon Kahl died in Arkansas, in the CSA’s backyard, its “territory,” 
the group advanced strongly “into the right wing movement in terms of taking 
action.” It was now willing to use its weapons in an offensive manner because of 
the “perception…the government had made war on the Christian patriot 
movement.” The right considered the deaths of Gordon Kahl and Robert 
Matthews of the Order, as the government telling the world the right wing was a 
threat it was intent on addressing. Unbeknownst to the government at the time,  
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the death of Kahl was a battle cry for the right-wing movement, and the CSA 
began making plans because it became its “duty” to protect others by taking 
offensive action.355 
Continually thwarted in their plans, the CSA decided God was not 
supportive of its pursuits. During that time, Noble was arguing with Jim Ellison 
over his place in Ellison’s kingdom and, desperate to prove himself to Ellison, 
offered to prove himself through action. According to Noble, it was his 
insecurities, fears, and feelings of not being worthy of Ellison that made him 
volunteer to take offensive action. Although not the original target, Noble and his 
associate walked into a gay church with a bomb, intending to set it. They felt God 
wanted them there and, based on the stereotype of gays in their minds, expected 
to find a scene of debauchery when they entered. They did not, but when the 
pastor spoke of his homosexual relationship, Noble confirmed it as their intended 
target. Homosexuality epitomized what the CSA stood against and viewed gays 
as enemies.356  
Noble and his associate sat in the services for the first 10 minutes ready to 
act, but knew they had to wait before leaving so they would not arouse suspicion. 
During the wait, Noble had time to look around and think, which he was not 
supposed to do. His thoughts struck him.  
They look like me. They’re no different than me except, you know, 
who they’re sitting next to. Why am I really here? Is this really going 
to start the so-called, Second American Revolution, or not? People 
are going to die. The people across the street are not involved and 
will die. I may die. I may get caught. God is offering no guarantees. 
Do I want to be known as a mass killer?357 
As his thoughts raced, Noble had doubts and questions about what he 
was about to do. The music began and people lifted their hands in prayer. Noble 
then realized, “They are no different than us.” He saw them lost and searching for 




                                            
their way through God as they struggled to fit in with society, “questioning 
probably their own identity.” Noble contemplated his intended victims, and 
everything changed. 
Their struggles automatically identified with my struggles and I’m 
identifying with theirs. Then all of a sudden they become me, and 
they become Christians, and there is no way I can justify killing 
Christians. They ceased to be homosexuals at that point. Once I 
saw they weren’t evil, they weren’t an enemy, then none of the 
other stuff mattered anymore.358 
After his 30 minutes inside the church, Noble questioned things again, but 
did not yet leave the CSA. He realized he was at the point at which he accepted 
what Ellison taught without question, but he had lacked the confidence during 
that time to question Ellison and stand up to him. Noble’s experience at the 
church changed everything for him and he was no longer arguing only with 
Ellison, but felt himself arguing with God. He wanted out, but God told him to 
stay. Noble said, in the end, God was right to make him stay and he believes the 
FBI siege would have ended differently without his presence. He was the 
stabilizing factor for the group and the only one who could have negotiated with 
the government. Without Noble, with the members of the Order present, and with 
the arsenal inside the compound, Ellison would have chosen to fight.359 
Noble has taken advantage of the years since his involvement to reflect 
and consider potential efforts to counter violent extremism. He suggested looking 
first for that individual who, like him, is the stabilizing factor within the group who 
could be the one who writes the newsletter, but also consider the backgrounds of 
the individuals within the group, such as educational history and family, religious, 
or political backgrounds. These things can direct counterterrorism experts to 
those most susceptible to talking. The older generation is less likely to dialogue 
because they have more to lose. These members, especially the group leaders, 
are involved for the power and prestige and they have too much invested to 
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support change. The younger members may not have positions of authority yet 
and their self-interest is not as strong. While the head of the organization “has 
too much invested to think outside his box,” sometimes people in leadership 
positions are approachable, as in the stabilizing factor above. Many times, these 
people may not be the top man, but they may have enough influence to assist 
with counterterrorism efforts, or at the very least, fragment the organization.360 
Noble feels “balanced-power” methods may work.361 The method has 
seen successful when applied to Islamist extremism, and the same things that 
lead one individual to an Islamist group, a left wing group, or the IRA, lead people 
to white supremacy. Every portion of society needs a seat at the table for a whole 
community effort if the model stands a chance of success to include churches, 
the media, the educational system, local government, law enforcement, 
especially the sheriff, and any group in society that can help offer alternatives 
and exposure to differing viewpoints. The key is to include every aspect of 
society possible to increase the groups’ exposure and “lessen the fears of the 
enemy.” “Everything in the movement is based upon fear.” When individual’s fear 
becomes so strong, they see no alternatives, they embrace violent extremism. 
Until that time, they may have extremist beliefs, but no desire to act on them and 
little threat exists. When they see no hope for change, extremist violence is more 
attractive. They experience pressure from above placed on them by the 
leadership and pressure from below placed on them by personal obligations, 
internal pressures, and fear. The individual either leaves, or breaks at this point. 
Society counters pressure from above when churches, schools, and law 
enforcement, filter in truth. Changes in the individual’s living conditions are 
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people see positive change in their personal situation, it alters their self-image, 
and counters pressures from above and below because it gives them hope for 
the future.362 
The solutions are not complicated, but they require society to talk about 
race and be open to change for the community, which means the kind of change 
the community truly wants, rather than the change the local government sees as 
best. It requires an understanding of the group’s ideology, and for religious 
groups, their theology. It requires an understanding of the group dynamics of 
those involved. It requires stressing the importance of commonalities rather than 
focusing on differences. It requires acknowledgement that even though people’s 
views may differ, they are similar, which should be the emphasis of any program. 
It requires an appeal to their patriotism and family values. It requires drawing on 
their internal motivations and redirecting them to productive pursuits, which is 
stronger even than any dialogue. The most important requirement is to provide 
alternatives, which breaks down the “us” versus “them” mindset. Incorporate the 
group into society rather than further alienating them.363 
Based on his experiences, Noble offers the following advice on 
counterterrorism efforts. 
Engage the group. Get away from this us versus them mentality 
because it doesn’t work. Going against something doesn’t work. 
You do the opposite of what they expect you to do, which is what 
Coulson did for us. You’ll become more effective. Speaking out 
against them gives them the reaction they want, and they win. If, on 
the other hand…you open up…some sort of collaborative 
communication, you might just get somewhere. That’s what’s 
needed. Don’t feed us versus them. Do what they don’t expect you 
to do. It’s simple to get people in these groups to think, but that 
doesn’t make it easy. 
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VII. OTHER APPROACHES 
When considering approaches to counter white supremacist violent 
extremism, no reason exists to start from scratch. Other countries have 
successfully implemented counterterrorism strategies for years, whether aimed at 
domestic or international counterterrorism efforts. Strategies are also used within 
the United States to target other groups, like gangs, that are useful to examine. 
With any previously tried program or strategy, it is necessary to review not only 
the successes, but the failures as well. Without consideration of why and how a 
program failed, reimplementation of the strategy is likely to result in the same 
mistakes.  
The United Kingdom has battled domestic terrorism for years and its 
Prevent strategy aimed at counterterrorism efforts within the Muslim population 
bear examination. In the United States, gang intervention has seen success for 
years as well. Both programs have strengths and weaknesses, but both have 
seen success. While not aimed at white supremacist organizations, they could 
work for that purpose. Using a program aimed at intervention or counterterrorism, 
with modifications for a specific group ideology and structure, could be 
successful for countering white supremacist violent extremism. Not only could a 
program be modified to target a different type of group, it can also be modified to 
target a group specific to local circumstances, which is the heart of research 
done by Brad Deardorff in his work, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity 
and the War on Terrorism.  
A. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S APPROACH 
The United Kingdom has a long history of responding to acts of terrorism, 
including the Troubles and Islamist terrorism. In the Troubles, the United 
Kingdom battled domestic terrorism from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).364 In response to the PIRA, the UK’s 
364 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 35–38. 
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government adopted a soft power approach and the tactic led to negotiation.365 
The cooperation of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) with the people, and the 
desire to address their legitimate grievances, led to the successful 
implementation of soft power tactics.366 By its demonstrated interest in resolving 
the Troubles and the resulting violence, the government gained credibility with 
the public.367 This atmosphere led to the government and community working 
together to find a successful resolution to the violence.368  
The approach during the Troubles proved successful, and the United 
Kingdom attempted to address Islamist terrorism following 9/11 in a similar 
fashion by embracing the Prevent strategy, which is part of the UK’s CONTEST 
counterterrorism strategy. CONTEST is a “balanced approach that incorporates 
both hard and soft power: aggressive military action and policing to disrupt 
terrorist operations paired with engagement strategies designed to stop the flow 
of new recruits and cut off support for terrorist organizations.”369 The Prevent 
component of CONTEST relies on the expectation that community involvement in 
the prevention of terrorism is vital and expected.370 This active involvement 
addresses five main areas of concern for counterterrorism strategists, which 
include the following. 
• Challenging violent extremist ideology 
• Disrupting the promotion of violent extremism 
• Individual support of recruits or those undergoing radicalization 
• Increased community resilience against violent extremism 
• Addressing legitimate grievances of the individual ideologies371  
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An important component of the Prevent strategy is the soft power 
approach, which proved successful during the Troubles. With the soft power 
component, the government entity works in conjunction with the community to 
counter radicalization. The driving idea behind soft power is that government will 
overlook petty criminal offenses in return for willing community leaders to 
intervene with the radicalization process and work to counter the violent extremist 
narrative.372 Government can always come back and address these minor 
offenses at a later time should the counter radicalization efforts prove 
unsuccessful, which leads to the hard power approach in a balanced power 
effort.373 As with the soft power approach during the Troubles, the community is 
allowed to develop a level of trust for HMG necessary for long-term collaboration 
related to counterterrorism efforts.  
In the United Kingdom, a strong community-policing model builds bridges 
with the community, develops trust, and opens lines of communication.374 In 
addition, the United Kingdom embraces the participation of nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs) to assist the community in increasing resiliency against the 
violent extremist narrative.375 The Channel program addresses individual recruits 
or those undergoing the radicalization process. The program uses a channel 
coordinator and panel of members who determine the best method of countering 
the narrative for each specific individual.376 Another important aspect of the UK 
Prevent strategy is local jurisdictions develop approaches individually, rather than 
an overarching policy coming from one central governmental agency.377 This 
strategy allows for differences in narratives and approaches specific for individual 
geographic locations. This component is vital because no one size fits all  
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approach exists for any policy. What works in one location or for one group, may 
not be successful when applied in different locations or with different groups 
espousing different ideologies.  
Not to imply that white supremacist organizations have legitimate 
grievances, as with the PIRA, but the Prevent strategy serves as a basis for the 
development of a successful design to counter violent extremism from other 
groups. The UK has been criticized for how it pursued the Prevent strategy, 
which requires consideration to prevent repeating the mistakes. While Prevent 
appears logical, and likely successful, based on past strategies during the 
Troubles, these criticisms deserve consideration. To begin, prior to the 7/7 
London bombings, Prevent was active and engaging with the community to 
combat violent extremism. The central thought throughout the process, however, 
remained on the possibility of foreign threats, as opposed to the domestic 
terrorist acts experienced during the height of the Troubles.378 Everything 
changed after 7/7 when the United Kingdom realized it faced a threat from within 
it never imagined. Differing perspectives on how to proceed with the Prevent 
strategy arose, but all included community involvement. The initial stage included 
HMG publicly reaching out to prominent community leaders to participate in a 
mandatory task force to combat violent extremism.379 The task force, called 
Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups (PET), included seven working 
groups comprised of more than 100 individuals discussing and recommending 
things government and the community should address.380 PET focused on the 
following items: engaging young people, education, engaging Muslim women, 
supporting regional and local initiatives, Imams’ training and accreditation, the 
role of mosques in the community, community security, increasing confidence in  
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policing, and addressing extremism and radicalization.381 In furtherance of the 
Prevent strategy, the community addresses violent extremism and radicalization, 
while the government only acts when needed.382  
Problems occurred in the beginning, which started with the members 
selected to participate in the working groups. Many had little or no record of 
accomplishment of community involvement. Many were lobbyists or tied to a 
particular political agenda. Few were independent and many lacked the expertise 
to decide on the issues at hand. It appeared a handful of government officials 
selected the working group membership from within their own spheres of 
influence. The groups met only three times and the members had to volunteer 
personal time to participate.383  
PET submitted recommendations for improvements following the 7/7 
attacks, but the government rejected them. The community saw this as evidence 
that PET was little more than a publicity stunt with no power to address, and 
surely no ability to prevent, violent extremism. In addition, rather than creating 
community cohesion, PET had the opposite effect. Communities, instead of 
working with the government to develop solutions, began depending on 
government intervention to address concerns. Recall that community 
involvement is necessary for a successful Prevent strategy.384  
With the downfall of PET, HMG took the approach of using a speaking 
tour of scholars teaching mainstream Islamic ideals. HMG also created the 
Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) for improving mosques 
and related organizations.385 MINAB includes representatives from all sectors of 
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Islam and remains in existence today.386 HMG also provided funds to NGOs 
working to counter violent extremism within the community, which led to the 
Prevent strategy.387 Another concern developed from the selection process of 
the NGOs the government funded, which was the unintended labeling of the 
Muslim community as either good or bad depending on its participation in a 
particular sector of Islam and the participation of that group within the Prevent 
strategy.388 Added to this image was that of the “ex-Islamist” as former radical 
Islamist adherents surfaced to help counter the violent extremist narrative.389 
The individuals, heavily covered by the media, appeared closely associated with 
right-wing adherents and government organizations, which led to the failure of 
the greater Muslim community to support their efforts.390 Unfortunately, these 
individuals had valuable information to contribute, but the Muslim community was 
unaccepting because of its openly expressed political agendas and government 
funding.391  
In 2012, a House of Commons Select Committee review of the Prevent 
strategy determined the following issues affected its implementation. 
• The strategy was not clear and the lack of a clear and consistent 
engagement strategy led to Prevent appearing arbitrary. 
• The government funding of programs dictated how Muslim society 
operated. Those programs that received government funding had 
no clear direction or mission for action. 
• The crossover of community and security concerns led to both 
agendas blurring, and a stigmatization of an entire segment of the 
population. A community engagement program that does not win 
over the people is doomed to fail. 
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• A culture of “gate-keepers” emerged with the close alliance of 
select cliques of government officials and individuals closely 
aligned with them acting as community representatives. 
• The program disrupted the Muslim community when it devolved into 
a program identifying good and bad Muslims, which led to a 
dividing line between us and them, the community and the 
government. 
• With the serious flaws listed above, the program developed a 
reputation of being nothing more than an elaborate government 
surveillance program.392  
While Prevent has seen its share of criticism, the idea behind the strategy 
has validity, but H. A. Hellyer makes the following suggestions for Prevent to 
work in the future. 
• Community cohesion must remain disengaged from 
counterterrorism. 
• The government must actively participate with those with which it 
may not agree. 
• It is imperative the government is willing to work with anyone who 
renounces violence. 
• All sections of the community must be involved and have a place at 
the table during discussions. 
• Government cannot interfere with theology. 
• Focus on restricting funding to hard power actions.393 
Government must understand extremism is not illegal, and accept the goal 
is to prevent violence. Further, all stakeholders must be engaged to see Prevent 
be successful in countering violent extremism.  
B. APPROACHES FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Robert Deardorff, based on his research, “Countering Violent Extremism: 
The Challenge and the Opportunity,” and The Roots of Our Children’s War: 
Identity and the War on Terrorism, suggested restructuring and processes to 
counter violent extremism as it relates to Islamism, using a “balanced-power” 
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approach, based on those from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.394 In 
the United States, Deardorff suggests using the community to notify law 
enforcement when it believes an individual is susceptible or undergoing the 
process of radicalization. Moderate clerical leaders within the Muslim community 
can then step in to counsel the individual and intervene. An open and transparent 
relationship with the Muslim community can help improve its comfort levels when 
hard power is necessary, such as the active involvement of law enforcement to 
interrupt a suspected terrorist plot. Further, this relationship of trust can lead the 
community to come forward with possible radicalization within its midst to allow 
law enforcement and religious leaders to intervene.395 Deardorff suggests the 
creation of ROC Centers to accomplish the coordination of an overarching 
national counterterrorism approach tailored to local level requirements.396 
Deardorff advocates a community policing approach to counterterrorism efforts, 
similar to anti-gang initiatives practiced by many law enforcement agencies for 
years.397 
White supremacist organizations operate clandestinely and the individuals 
most aware of suspicious circumstances, and indicators of potential extremist 
violence, are those already within the in-group, or former members of the in-
group. Those individuals are the mostly likely to have the insight to interrupt 
potential violent extremism, and are those with whom open dialogue is most 
beneficial in the end. In addition, they are the individuals most likely to have 
credibility with someone during the soft power stage of engagement. At some 
point, however, someone in the community or educational system noticed a 
change in these individuals, and to reach the point of engaging the leadership, it  
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is necessary to begin with the community. This approach has proven effective in 
gang intervention according to research by Kimberly Tobin, which she details in 
her work, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective.  
Tobin suggests a three-pronged approach to gang intervention including 
targeting at risk populations, high-risk youths, and redirection efforts.398 In the 
primary targeting of at risk populations, educational efforts target the entire 
population.399 With high-risk youths, the aim is to prevent them from joining 
gangs and those individuals, already exposed to gang life, are the primary 
targets for education and intervention at this stage.400 For the third level of 
prevention, the target is those already involved in gangs and the goal is to 
prevent gang members from continued membership within their respective 
groups.401 For successful implementation of this three-pronged approach, Tobin 
suggests the application of the Sperger Model as the prevention framework.402  
The Sperger Model was determined an effective method during a five-year 
study in Chicago, Illinois.403 The Chicago Police Department, however, failed to 
commit fully to the program, which resulted in community ambivalence for 
continuation.404 The Sperger Model incorporates the following elements: 
community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provisions, 
suppression, and organizational change.405 Community mobilization, based on 
social disorganization theory, aims to strengthen ineffective communities by 
fostering cooperation among social services agencies.406 Social intervention, 
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based on theories addressing individual risks, including family dynamics and 
psychological problems, aims to correct these deficiencies.407 Opportunities 
provisions, based on underclass theory, aims to provide opportunities for 
education and employment advancement not available in the community.408 
Suppression, based on deterrence, aims to increase consequences for gang 
membership, as involvement is an individual choice.409 Law enforcement tends 
to embrace suppression as an intervention policy, which is not successful 
alone.410 Organizational change relies on the use of the judicial system as an 
effective policy for the suppression of gang related behavior.411 
The premise behind the Sperger Model is that true intervention requires a 
comprehensive multi-pronged approach that addresses the individual, in 
conjunction with the community, law enforcement, and the judicial system.412 
None of the methods finds success when used alone, but together, are 
successful in gang intervention. The Sperger Model also allows modification to 
reflect the individual community involved, along with the particulars of the gang 
involvement within that community, because no one size fits all approach for 
prevention exists.413 It is necessary to modify the five target areas to fit the 
geographical location, the community composition, the type of organization, and 
regional beliefs and values.  
While neither Deardorff’s model, nor the Sperger Model for gang 
intervention, focuses on countering violent extremism from white supremacist 
organizations, both models serve as the building blocks for a potential design. 
That being the case, it is vital to consider both their strengths and weaknesses to 
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keep from repeating previous mistakes. Deardorff’s work holds great potential to 
be applicable to all types of extremist organizations. It applies traditional 
community policing models, and changes the mindset of the law enforcement 
agency to one of terrorism prevention as opposed to community relations, which 
requires little to no political risk on the part of the agency, but is also unlikely to 
yield positive counterterrorism results.414 His research advocates the 
implementation and action of a National Counterterrorism Strategy with funding 
attached, and tailored for local level requirements.415 The framework of SIT used 
by Deardorff is the main component that increases the likelihood of applying it to 
organizations besides those espousing Salfi-jihadist narrative, which are the 
focus of his research.416 The theory allows those involved in counterterrorism 
efforts to understand the motivations of the groups they seek to engage.417 
414 Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 201. 
415 Ibid., 204, 219–221. 
416 Ibid., 198. 
417 Ibid., 186. 
 91 
                                            
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 92 
VIII. ANALYSIS 
The researcher compared a KKK case study to a case study involving the 
CSA. The research subject in the KKK case study was Robert Leslie Spence, Jr., 
former Imperial Wizard of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, located in 
Texas.418 The research subject in the CSA case study was Kerry Wayne Noble, 
former second in command of the CSA, located in Arkansas.419 The researcher 
chose the former leaders based on their decisions to interrupt or abort a terrorist 
plot within their respective organizations.420 Both cases detail a successful 
intervention that did not involve outside deterrence to prevent the specific 
domestic terror incident. This research compares the KKK case with the CSA 
case to determine if “balanced-power” may successfully counter violent 
extremism committed by white supremacist adherents.421 The analysis sought to 
determine patterns and causal relationships relevant to countering violent 
extremism.  
After collection, the researcher organized data obtained from the individual 
case studies in relation to the research questions. The researcher matched 
individual interview questions to specific research questions, as well as any 
additional data that emerged. As a theoretical framework, the researcher applied 
SIT to the specific research questions and additional emergent themes obtained 
during the interview process to allow for the categorization of similar themes and 
ideologies that emerged during the research process. The researcher also used 
specific quotes to assist in illustrating the individual themes that emerged related 
to the research questions. 
The researcher coded the interview questions both individually, and 
related to the five research themes. For case comparison, the researcher created 
418 Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.”  
419 Bishop, “Plot Against U.S. Described In Court.” 
420 Ibid.; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate; Biederman, “Ku Klux Klowns.” 
421 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19. 
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a Word table for each interview question, as well as for each research 
category.422 This table allowed for determining cross-case similarities and 
patterns more easily. While the analytical method relies on the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data, the method is analogous to cross-experiment 
interpretation methods using quantitative data.423 The Word tables created for 
each interview question, and each research question, appear in the Appendix. 
To refresh the reader, five questions were addressed in this research. 
• Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
• Are there generational differences in leadership that effect 
interactions with the group? 
• Does religion influence race relations? 
• What induces participation in the group? 
• Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to 
counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
Each research subject answered 14 questions related to the five research 
themes. 
• How did you get involved with the organization? 
• Why did you join? 
• Why do others join? 
• What do you see as the relationship between different races? 
• Do you participate in organized religion? 
• What are your thoughts on Christian Identity? 
• How do you recruit new members? 
• Is there a difference in leadership with different generations? 
• What are your feelings toward law enforcement? 
• Would you ever trust them? 
• Does your organization condone violence? 
422 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods: 5 (Applied Social Research 
Methods), 4th edition (Sage Publications, Inc, 2008), 160. 
423 Ibid. 
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• Could a relationship be developed between your organization and 
law enforcement? 
• Who would need to be involved? 
• What approach would you suggest? 
The research questions were as follows. 
• Questions nine (9), ten (10), and eleven (11) related to theme one, 
the possibility of countering KKK violent extremism.  
• Question eight (8) related to theme two, generational leadership 
differences.  
• Questions four (4), five (5), and six (6) related to theme three, 
religious influence on race relations.  
• Questions one (1), two (2), three (3), and seven (7) related the 
theme four, group participation.  
• Questions twelve (12), thirteen (13), and fourteen (14), related to 
theme five, the possible effectiveness of “balanced-power.”  
A. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Research question one addressed the possibility of countering violent 
extremism from within the KKK. The data revealed some unexpected similarities 
between the two organizations. A common anti-government theme emerged 
within the two very different groups. Both the KKK and the CSA recognized the 
County Sheriff as the only law enforcement entity with authority.424 Posse 
Comitatus, which is Latin for “power of the county,” stems from medieval British 
law that allowed the Sheriff to summon members of the citizenry to quell 
insurrection and apprehend criminals.425 Following reconstruction, the Posse 
Comitatus Act of 1878, restricted the U.S. military from enforcing laws within 
individual states, with the original intent of restricting troops from policing state 
elections held in former Confederate states.426 Although exceptions occur to the 
Posse Comitatus Act, the right-wing movement embraces the original idea of 
424 Noble, August 14, 2013; Robert Spence, September 5, 2013. 
425 Daniel Levitas, The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right, 1st. 
ed., November 2002 (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2004), 2. 
426 RAND, “Overview of Posse Comitatus Act,” (n.d.), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf, 1–2, 
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Posse Comitatus as it relates to the Sheriff’s authority.427 Noble referenced 
Posse Comitatus when explaining the County Sheriff is the only ruling official.428 
Spence went further and explained, because the Sheriff is an elected official, the 
people grant his authority, and he is, therefore, the only authority recognized by 
the Klan.429  
In addition to the anti-government rhetoric, both the KKK and the CSA 
wanted war with the U.S. government.430 The KKK’s desire to bomb the Mitchell 
Energy plant was part of an overall plan to finance a war with the government.431 
While the CSA’s plan to bomb the Metropolitan Community Church was not to 
help finance the war, it was to start the war in response to the death of tax 
protestor Gordon Kahl.432 Both subjects expressed personal views about 
concerns of government interference and faulty decision making.433 In addition, 
both subjects expressed a strong sense of patriotism and love of country, which 
was common with both groups, along with the importance of family values.434 
These last two may seem to contradict the anti-government beliefs, but in fact, do 
not. Both groups see faulty government decision making as detrimental to the 
country they love and want to see it protected. They hold a strong positive 
identity related to their citizenship and membership in the American in-group. As 
they perceive the country challenged by the government, they must act to 
maintain their honor. For instance, when discussing the CSA’s offensive reaction 
to Kahl’s death, Noble stated the group’s “perception was the government had 
made war on the Christian patriot movement.”435 He added, “Because of Kahl 
427 RAND, “Overview of Posse Comitatus Act,” 2–3; Levitas, The Terrorist Next Door, 2. 
428 Noble, interview. 
429 Spence, interview. 
430 Ibid.; Noble, interview. 
431 Spence, interview. 
432 Noble, interview. 
433 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
434 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
435 Noble, interview. 
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being killed in Arkansas, it became our duty to become offensive we thought.”436 
The same holds true for the groups’ beliefs in family values and protection of the 
family unit. The family is, like their American identity, another in-group to which 
each person belongs and for which they fight to maintain a positive self-identity. 
Challenge of the family unit elicits a similar response, if not stronger, as a 
challenge to patriotism. 
Interview question nine related to general feelings about law enforcement. 
The only common theme involved the Sheriff as the only official with authority.437 
Noble addressed Posse Comitatus as the determining influence and discussed 
the group’s concern of not targeting the Sheriff and deputies during the FBI siege 
at their compound, specifically due to their personal relationship that evolved 
over the years.438 Spence discussed his personal support of local law 
enforcement, despite his organization’s disagreement.439 In addition, the right-
wing movement as a whole, only recognizes the authority of Sheriffs because 
they are elected by the people, adds Spence.440 
Interview question ten related to trust of law enforcement. The only 
common theme involved the requirement of time to develop trust through 
personal relationships.441 Spence explained that the KKK allows law 
enforcement into the organization as members, but they are not trusted with all 
Klavern information.442 In addition, Spence stated that despite his support of 
local law enforcement, he only trusts those individuals he knows directly and with 
whom he has a personal relationship.443 Noble explains the CSA developed trust 
with its local Sheriff and deputies over a period of years, which included the 
436 Noble, interview. 
437 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
438 Noble, interview. 
439 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
440 Spence, interview. 
441 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
442 Spence, interview. 
443 Ibid. 
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officials visiting the CSA’s compound and checking on the membership.444 This 
trust encouraged open dialogue with the group over an extended time.445 
Interview question eleven asked if the organizations condoned violence. 
No similar themes emerged in response to this question. Spence explained the 
Klan as a whole does not openly condone violence, including the leadership.446 
The individual members, however, may disagree and split off into the small cell 
structure advocated by fellow Klansman Louis Beam, known as “Leaderless 
Resistance.”447 This situation presents the greatest danger related to violence 
from within the organization. Interestingly, the significant reason the KKK and its 
leaders disavow violence is not because it is appropriate, but rather in fear of 
prosecution under RICO should they be associated with any violent extremist 
acts from its membership.448 Noble, on the other hand, said the CSA evolved 
into a group that did condone, even perpetrate, acts of violence.449 The group 
began as a pacifist organization, and over time, evolved into a Christian patriot 
organization willing to use violence in defense of fellow patriots.450 The death of 
Gordon Kahl forced the group into the challenge-response mode detailed above. 
The group perceived his death as a challenge by the U.S. government and felt it 
was its duty to defend others, or rather, its honor. Failure to act would shame the 
CSA in the eyes of the right-wing movement. The CSA’s response to the 
challenge was going to war with the government, which the church bombing was 
to begin. 
444 Noble, interview. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Spence, interview. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Noble, interview. 
450 Ibid. 
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B. GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERACTIONS 
Research question two related to generational differences in leadership 
that affect interactions with the group. No common themes emerged. Both 
subjects felt a difference in the generations existed, including how to possibly 
interacting with them. The viewpoints were completely different, however. 
Spence felt interactions with older leaders within the organization was a better 
option because they are more likely to do the “right” thing in relation to protecting 
innocents from violence perpetrated by the membership.451 Further, the leaders’ 
extreme fear of RICO mean they are inclined to direct law enforcement to 
insiders involved in small cell operations.452 Younger members of the KKK had 
an increased likelihood of involvement in the small cell operations aimed at 
committing acts of violence.453  
From Noble’s perspective, the older leaders were less likely to cooperate 
in any manner with anyone.454 They have more invested in the movement and 
more to lose, including the power and prestige desired by the “old guard.”455 
Younger members, however, have not yet achieved positions of authority and 
their self-interest is not at the same level as the older generation.456 This 
situation makes them more likely to embrace interactions from outside the 
organization. While these leaders disagree on potential effective approaches to 
this issue, the differences may be attributed to differences in group identity, 
ideology, experiences, or personal direction within their specific organizations.  
Interview question eight related to generational leadership differences and 
was the only question specifically related to the theme of interactions with the 
group based on generational differences. Again, no common themes and 
451 Spence, interview. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Ibid. 




                                            
divergent viewpoints emerged. Spence stated KKK perpetrated move violence, 
which he attributed to the organization being less family oriented with younger 
generations, and the threat of lone wolf extremist violence, which is more likely to 
involve younger members.457 Spence said, “Lone wolves are really the problem 
because there is no oversight for their actions.”458 Noble again disagreed 
because older members were not supportive of outsiders.459 The in-group/out-
group dynamic is stronger with the older members, who have a pronounced “us 
versus them” mentality.460 Leaders within the organization may hold sway with 
the group as a whole, but the head of the organization “has too much invested to 
be willing to think outside his box.”461 
C. RELIGION AND RACE RELATIONS 
Research question three related to the influence of religion on race 
relations. The KKK has a history of anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and acting as 
protector of white Protestant America.462 The CSA’s Christian Identity beliefs 
involved religious doctrine to explain race relations.463 However, no common 
themes were related to religion and race relations with the two groups, as the 
views depended on the motivation of the particular group. For Spence’s KKK, the 
motivation behind views on race relations was entirely political and based on the 
Klan’s understanding the government manipulates minorities and only allows 
them the level of power the government desires.464 Spence was also of the 
opinion that Identity promotes violence, and personally, felt violence based on 
457 Spence, interview. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Noble, interview. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 33, 112–113; Spence, interview. 
463 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 85–86, 88–89; Noble, interview; Brannan, “Violence, 
Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 45, 124–125. 
464 Spence, interview. 
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race was unacceptable.465 The CSA approached race relations from a strictly 
religious stance. Racial prejudice was theologically acceptable and the group 
believed minorities were pre-Adamic and the white race was the only race 
descended from the union of Adam and Eve.466 Also, no minorities were allowed 
within the religious group from its inception, not because the CSA denied its 
association, but rather, because it did not attempt to join the commune.467 The 
implication, according to Noble, is it is easier to stereotype individuals when no 
one has prior associations with others like them.468 It is easier to place the 
“other” in the out-group when someone does not know anyone else like them. 
Interview question four related to views regarding the relationship between 
races. Again, no common themes emerged as the groups’ views on race related 
to their motivation, whether political or religious. For the KKK, attitudes regarding 
race revolved around government involvement and the political aspects of race 
relations, especially related to hate crime accusations.469 A strong underlying 
fear of potential future incidents labeled as hate crimes was based on the group 
openly expressing racial beliefs.470 While Spence said he personally thinks 
individuals should not hate based on skin color, but rather respect people as 
individuals, he does admit he does not condone interracial relationships and 
blacks are on the Klan’s list of groups it dislikes.471 For the CSA, views on race 
relations relied strictly on theology and specific biblical scriptures. Christian 
Identity is a white supremacist religion, which adheres to the belief that Anglo 
Saxons are the true Israel.472 The CSA embraced the seed-line doctrine of the 
465 Spence, interview. 
466 Noble, interview. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Spence, interview. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid. 
472 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 85–86, 88–89; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of 
Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 124–125. 
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Christian Identity religion, which believes the true Israel descends from the union 
between Adam and Eve, while the Jews descend from the union of Eve and the 
Devil.473 Noble, who no longer holds these beliefs, had little issue with them 
while a member of the CSA.474 
Interview question five relates to the research subjects’ involvement in 
organized religion. Again, no common themes emerged between the two. 
Spence is a lifelong Southern Baptist and he did not elaborate on the topic.475 
Noble feels organized religion is too confining and does not encourage 
independent thought.476 It is nothing more than one person telling others what to 
believe, much like his time in the CSA.477 Noble searched for a church upon his 
release from prison and currently attends a branch of the Unity church, but 
continues to long for Christian communal living, akin to the early time of the 
original “Zarephath” community, before its evolution into the CSA.478 
Interview question six related to the subjects’ thoughts on Christian 
Identity. The only commonality related to the potential violence of the Rebellious 
Christian Identity believers.479 Spence referred to Christian identity adherents as 
“crazy” and to the CSA specifically as “nuts.”480 He was of the opinion believers 
thought their religion was only true religion and the beliefs, and believers, were 
violent.481 Noble replied, “It’s a joke.”482 He said the theology is deceptive and 
specific scriptural explanations serve to decrease the individual’s internal 
473 Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious 
Christian Identity,” 45; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 88. 
474 Noble, interview. 
475 Spence, interview. 
476 Noble, interview. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Ibid.; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 29. 
479 Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious 
Christian Identity,” 39–40. 
480 Spence, interview. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Noble, interview. 
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struggles.483 Like organized religion, Noble explained the group believed the 
theology based on the teachings of Ellison, its leader, and its isolation, which 
prevented exposure to alternative viewpoints.484 In hindsight, Noble ponders if 
current adherents use Identity as an excuse for violent action rather than truly 
believing the doctrine.485 He feels more exposure to dissenting data existed than 
was available during the height of the CSA.486 Despite the availability of 
information rebuking the beliefs of adherents to Christina Identity, the in-group 
solidarity remains, as with the CSA, which has much to do with the potential for 
violence. The group must maintain a positive self-identity, and the negative 
identity of the out-group only serves to strengthen the in-group. As discussed 
earlier in the research, when collective reality becomes the norm within the 
group, the potential to base “defense” of the group on a violent ideology becomes 
acceptable.487 
D. GROUP PARTICIPATION 
Research question four related to the inducement to participate in these 
groups, and was the only research area in which numerous commonalities 
emerged. The differences that emerged related mainly to the motivation of the 
individual research subjects. Common themes with group involvement in the KKK 
and the CSA included family, belonging, personal relationships, and recruitment. 
For Spence, his participation in the Klan began with family ties and continued 
with the personal relationships he developed.488 Others join the KKK for the 
family orientation and sense of belonging not only to a group, but to a family as 
well.489 In addition, the most successful recruiting methods involve calling on 




487 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, 149, 182. 
488 Spence, interview. 
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those personal relationships, which include the individual member’s friends.490 
For Noble, his participation in the CSA began with personal relationship with 
friends and the camaraderie of the communal living arrangements.491 Others 
joined the CSA for the “family” gained by participation, in addition to an internal 
longing to belong to a group and something seen as a larger cause.492 As with 
the KKK, the most successful recruiting methods involved calling on personal 
relationships with former friends and biological family.493  
The data emerging from this research topic adheres to the theoretical 
framework of SIT very well. SIT is useful in explaining the importance of group 
dynamics and the central idea of SIT is the individual desire to establish a distinct 
identity, which affects a person in a positive way.494 No benefit exists for 
individuals to establish identities that make them feel bad about themselves, or 
reflect themselves in a negative light. SIT suggests that individuals, in search of 
this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a group that 
will fulfill their emotional needs.495 The group will be of like-minded individuals, 
who bolster the new member, and increase the positive feelings associated with 
their identity.  
SIT places the most importance in dynamics of the group because 
individuals’ identity ties to group membership in that it enables individuals to join 
the group.496 Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons 
between themselves and both members of the group (in-group) and those 
outside the group (out-group).497 These comparisons to others determine the 
490 Spence, interview. 
491 Noble, interview. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context, 94. 
495 Ibid., 95. 
496 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 21. 
497 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 96. 
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influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on the individuals, in that 
they necessarily self-identify as members of particular groups as part of both 
their personal and social identity.498 
Interview question five relates to how the individual research subjects 
became involved with their respective organizations. The commonality involved 
personal relationships. Spence lived with his grandfather, who was a local 
Klavern leader, and began attending meetings with him at the age of six.499 
Following years away from the movement, Spence renewed his Klan association 
in the military when his fellow Marines and he held Klavern meetings in their 
California barracks.500 Noble, not born into the organization, also became 
involved through personal relationships.501 He and his wife visited friends in the 
commune with plans to have their child in the community.502 The Nobles, drawn 
by their love of the people and the location, chose to remain.503 While these 
personal relationships did not originally involve the groups the subjects later 
joined, they are still in-groups. Every individual has multiple associations in 
separate in-groups with whom to self-identify that can include race, gender, 
political affiliation, religion, citizenship, or any number of groups or identities 
people considers themselves. With Spence and Noble, one in-group led them to 
others, where they joined additional in-groups. 
Interview question two related to not only why the subjects associated with 
their organizations, but also why they chose to join the group. The responses to 
question two mirrored those of question one in most instances. Spence related 
very similar information to question one, but focused on his personal associations 
from the military and friendship with Tom Metzger as the main reasons he 
498 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 100. 
499 Spence, interview. 
500 Ibid. 




                                            
renewed his Klan involvement from childhood.504 Spence also explained the Klan 
is a family tradition, which makes it normal, perhaps even expected, with that 
particular in-group.505 For Noble, the attraction of Christian communal living, 
including common goals and fellowship, were the main draws for joining.506 He 
explained, “You become so self-identified with each other, with the group, that 
you realize, ‘We are a little different than everyone else.’ You’ve taken how you 
would be with society and transferred that to the collective.”507 Noble felt his new 
“family” was a utopia.508 As Spence and Noble added their organizations to their 
associations, they developed new in-groups to describe a new part of their self-
identity. At the time of their associations, the KKK and the CSA gave Spence and 
Noble positive self-identities. 
Interview question three related to why others joined the organizations. 
The responses from two vastly different organizations were strikingly similar. The 
two main themes included family and a sense of belonging.509 Both Spence and 
Noble explained a draw to the KKK and the CSA include the family oriented 
environments and the sense of belonging to another “family” of like-minded 
individuals.510 This familial situation not only satisfies the internal longing to join a 
group when individuals may have nothing else in their lives that elicits a positive 
self-identity, but also, the internal need to belong and contribute to a larger 
cause.511 The differences that arose in the responses related to government and 
community. Spence stated many individuals join the KKK based on their distrust 
504 Spence, interview. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Noble, interview. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
510 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
511 Noble, interview; Spence, interview; Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup 
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of the federal government, and in hopes of avoiding taxes.512 Spence explains, 
“To the Klan the enemy is the federal government, period.”513 Therefore, when 
an individual is searching for an in-group association based on anti-government 
views, the Klan is a viable option. Noble’s response explained the lure of 
community because it draws people together and creates a stronger bond and 
collective identity to the point members’ feelings toward one another include, “I 
would die for you.”514 To an individual searching to fill a void, this feeling is a 
powerful motivation to participate. 
Interview question seven related to recruitment activities. With the 
exception of Noble’s assertion that religious groups often feel growing the 
organization is in God’s hands, the responses were similar.515 Both subjects 
detail recruiting efforts to include public or active recruiting measures like rallies 
and local gathering spots, advertisements like flyers and publications, and 
membership driven recruitment like tapping into personal relationships.516 Both 
Spence and Noble agreed that membership recruitment of former friends and 
family was the best way to grow the groups, should they choose to increase their 
numbers.517 This type of recruitment allows the group to grow, while maintaining 
similar in-group dynamics because members will necessarily target like-minded 
people with whom they already have close personal relationships. 
E. “BALANCED-POWER” AND KLAN VIOLENCE 
Research question five related to the feasibility of using “balanced-power” 
efforts to counter Klan violent extremism. The only common themes that 
emerged in the responses were the view of the County Sheriff as the only ruling 
512 Spence, interview. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Noble, interview. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
517 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
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official and the need for trust and honesty in any process.518 Spence felt for the 
KKK, the only way to counter violent extremism was with hard-power tactics 
using law enforcement investigative methods.519 The law enforcement agency 
was still required to approach the individual honestly and play on family values 
and patriotism to gain trust and cooperation.520 Noble, on the other hand, 
advocated only a soft-power approach using whole community efforts.521 Noble 
agreed the law enforcement officials must be honest and consider the 
background of the particular individual they target to know what values to play 
upon, such as family, religious, or political.522 Both men agreed the Sheriff is in 
the best position to have success with any method or communication.523 
Interview question twelve related to the possibility of a relationship 
between law enforcement and the group. The only common themes included 
trust/honesty and family values.524 Spence felt with the KKK, law enforcement 
needs prior knowledge of a possible plot and can use that knowledge to 
approach the targeted individual with the request, “We need your help.”525 Play 
on the patriotic self-image and the foundational support of women and children to 
sway the individual, who should be within a leadership position, and developed 
as a confidential informant.526 For Noble, he felt engaging groups like the CSA 
was possible, but potentially harder unless law enforcement can identity 
someone who is the stabilizing factor within the organization, as he was with 
Ellison.527 Consider the person who authors the newsletter and consider any 
518 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
519 Spence, interview. 
520 Ibid. 
521 Noble, interview. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
524 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
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targeted individual’s educational, family, religious, and political background.528 
The key is to approach people in an honest, non-threatening manner, showing 
concern and a willingness to talk.529 Dispel the view of law enforcement as the 
“enemy.”530 
Interview question thirteen related to who should be involved in the 
relationship. Again, the only common theme was the County Sheriff. Given the 
strong anti-government rhetoric in both the KKK and the CSA, Posse Comitatus 
is important in their views.531 This movement requires the only ruling authority, 
the Sheriff, to play a central role if any relationship stands a chance of success. 
Everything else related to the topic was different, but in line with each subject’s 
response to interview question twelve. Spence felt the only ones involved would 
have to be the informant and the one law enforcement official assigned as their 
handler.532 Trust is vital in these relationships, and law enforcement cannot 
engage the informant in front of others, including family.533 Noble felt every 
aspect of society should participate to increase exposure to differing ideologies, 
thus increasing the likelihood of successful counterterrorism efforts.534 These 
aspects included the educational system, media, social service agencies, and 
churches.535 Noble advocated honest, open dialogue that stressed 
commonalities in ideals, such as patriotism and family values, to dispel fear of 
the “other.”536 Noble explained that honest dialogue decreases fear, which is the 
driving force in the right-wing movement.537 
528 Noble, interview. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid. 
531 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
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Interview question fourteen related to the subjects’ suggested 
counterterrorism approaches. They had nothing in common and related closely to 
the subject’s individual responses to questions twelve and thirteen. Spence said 
with the KKK, the only alternative to the confidential informant scenario was the 
infiltration of the organization with undercover law enforcement resources.538 
This infiltration may allow law enforcement to gain intimate knowledge of small 
cell operations, but could potentially be dangerous for the officer. He felt no other 
approach works with the KKK.539 Noble continued with the whole community 
approach based on soft-power methods, and expounded on his suggestions.540 
For members of organizations like the CSA, they experience pressure from 
above via the organizational leaders, and pressure from below through personal 
obligations like family.541 As individuals feel more pressure, they see no hope 
and stand an increased chance of perpetrating extremist violence.542 By 
improving the individual’s circumstances, increased hope occurs as does less 
dependence on the in-group rhetoric.543 Noble stated programs aimed at 
improving these circumstances stand the greatest chances of success.544 It is 
important to consider Noble’s suggestions cannot target only one of the 
individual’s circumstances, as seen with gang intervention methods in the United 
States, but rather require a multi-pronged approach using the whole community 
to be successful.545 Noble explains it is necessary to treat the groups as they 
would not expect to lessen their fears of the “enemy” and dispel stereotypes they 
may hold.546 Part of any successful program will redirect the individual’s energy 
538 Spence, interview. 
539 Ibid. 





545 Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective, 150–159. 
546 Noble, interview. 
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to positive pursuit and involve the group in the community at large.547 It is vital to 
understand the particular group’s ideology and theology, and not feed the “us” 
versus “them” mentality.548 
This chapter provides data related to all five research categories and 14 
individual interview questions. In the next chapter, the research draws 
conclusions from the data, related to the focus of this research. Then, the 
research provides recommendations for the next step related to the possibility of 
countering Klan violent extremism.  
547 Noble, interview. 
548 Ibid. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Brad Deardorff’s, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War 
on Terrorism, suggests implementing “Regional Outreach Coordination Centers 
(ROC Centers)…to coordinate engagement activities and tailor local approaches” 
in counterterrorism efforts.549 Sustained engagement between groups normally 
seen in opposition necessarily engages individuals on a cognitive and an 
emotional level, as well as encourages evaluation of differing perspectives during 
discussion. Deardorff explains, “ideologies, therefore, are best countered by 
creating experiences that conflict with preconceived stereotypes and the 
opponent’s narrative.”550 
The UK’s Prevent and Deardorff’s “balanced-power,” both discussed in 
Chapter VII, related to different counterterrorism approaches, target religious 
extremist groups. The Sperger Model, also discussed in Chapter VII, combats 
gang membership. White supremacist organizations fall under neither category. 
All the models, however, have the common goal of reducing violent extremism 
from within the ranks of whatever group they target. The goal of this research 
was to determine if the application of Deardorff’s “balanced-power” and ROC 
Centers made a successful foundational approach for counterterrorism efforts 
related to Klan violence.551 
The possible application of “balanced-power” considered a different “end 
game” than normally seen by law enforcement. The desired outcome was not to 
conduct surveillance, pursue criminal investigations, or arrest members of the 
organization. The goal, instead, was employing a combination of methods to 
develop a new model aimed at preventing acts of KKK violent extremism. 
Although previously emphasized, a denial of the presence of white supremacist 
549 Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 223. 
550 Ibid., 219. 
551 Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity,” 19; 
Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism. 
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organizations within the DFW area exists; however, they are there. Not only the 
KKK and CSA leaders involved in this research, but large groups of organizations 
in the rural Southeastern portion of Dallas, self-identify as Aryan groups or white 
supremacists, whether law enforcement agrees with their self-imposed identities 
or not.552 In opposition to the taboo idea of colluding with racists, a potential 
social benefit is possible if law enforcement is willing to work with any individuals 
who renounce violence as a way to further extremist beliefs.553  
Recall the five themes addressed in this research. 
• Is it possible to counter violent extremism from within KKK? 
• Are there generational differences in leadership that effect 
interactions with the group? 
• Does religion influence race relations? 
• What induces participation in the group? 
• Is “balanced-power” an effective foundation for a program to 
counter violent extremism from within the KKK? 
A. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Surprisingly, a common anti-government theme emerged within the two 
very different groups. Both the KKK and the CSA recognized the County Sheriff 
as the only law enforcement entity with authority and they both wanted war with 
the U.S. government.554 The KKK’s desire to bomb the Mitchell Energy plant was 
part of an overall plan to finance a war with the government.555 While the CSA’s 
plan to bomb the Metropolitan Community Church was not to help finance the 
war, it was to start the war in response to the death of tax protestor Gordon 
Kahl.556 In addition, both subjects expressed a strong sense of patriotism and 
552 ADL, “The Aryan Brotherhood of Texas”; The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate, 
11; Personal knowledge of the researcher, based on employment. 
553 Hellyer, Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, 
Present, and Future, 42. 
554 Spence, interview; Noble, interview. 
555 Spence, interview. 
556 Noble, interview. 
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love of country, which was common with both groups, along with the importance 
of family values.557 These last two may seem to contradict the anti-government 
beliefs, but in fact do not. Both groups see faulty government decision making as 
detrimental to the country they love. They hold a strong positive identity related to 
their U.S. citizenship and membership in the American in-group. The same holds 
true for the groups’ beliefs in family values and protection of the family unit. The 
family is, like their American identity, another in-group people belong to in which 
they maintain a positive self-identity. Challenge of the family unit elicits a similar 
response, if not stronger, as a challenge to patriotism. 
Aside from these similarities, divergent viewpoints emerged related to 
KKK and CSA leaders, Bob Spence and Kerry Noble, respectively. The research 
did not prove the ability to counter KKK violent extremism. The unexpected 
discovery was the anti-government tie between, what most perceive as a racially 
motivated hate group, the KKK, and a Christian patriot group, the CSA. It 
appears that the right-wing movement, rather than motivated by the idea of white 
supremacy, potentially adheres more to an anti-government agenda, similar to 
the “Freemen” movement, which, according to Joel Dyer, “applies to anyone 
claiming to be a sovereign.”558  
B. GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES AND INTERACTIONS 
When considering generational differences’ effect on interaction with the 
KKK and the CSA, no similarities emerged. Spence and Noble were in complete 
disagreement on the topic. Spence felt the KKK was currently more violent, 
which he attributed to the organization being less family oriented among younger 
members, as well as the threat of lone wolf extremist violence, which is 
potentially more likely to involve younger members.559 Spence said, “Lone 
557 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
558 Dyer, Harvest Of Rage: Why Oklahoma City Is Only The Beginning, 193. 
559 Spence, interview. 
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wolves are really the problem because there is no oversight for their actions.”560 
Noble, however, felt older members were less likely to be supportive of outsiders 
than younger members.561 He saw the in-group/out-group dynamic as stronger 
with the older members, who have a pronounced “us versus them” mentality.562 
Leaders within the organization may hold sway with the group as a whole, but the 
head of the organization “has too much invested to be willing to think outside his 
box.”563 
The research did not prove common generational differences in leadership 
affect interactions with the group. As each group is individual, so too is the 
leadership. When developing successful counterterrorism policy, if choosing a 
potential engagement with group leadership, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the specific leader in question. Assumptions based on common 
generational principles are likely to be unsuccessful. 
C. RELIGION AND RACE RELATIONS 
Spence and Noble did not agree on the influence of religion on race 
relations. For the KKK, attitudes regarding race revolved around government 
involvement and the political aspects of race relations, especially related to hate 
crime accusations.564 A strong underlying fear of potential future incidents 
labeled as hate crimes arose based on the group openly expressing racial 
beliefs.565 For the CSA, views on race relations relied strictly on theology and 
specific biblical scriptures. Christian Identity is a white supremacist religion, 
which adheres to the belief that Anglo Saxons are the true Israel.566 The CSA 
560 Spence, interview. 
561 Noble, interview. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Spence, interview. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 85–86, 88–89; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of 
Theology: Repentant and Rebellious Christian Identity, 124–125. 
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embraced the seed-line doctrine of the Christian Identity religion and believed the 
true Israel descends from the union between Adam and Eve, while the Jews 
descend from the union of Eve and the Devil.567  
Despite the KKK’s history of anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and acting as 
protector of white Protestant America, no association emerged with the 
religiously motivated CSA.568 The research did not prove religion influences race 
relations, or even perceptions. Assumptions based on the perceived religious 
leanings on any organization with regard to counterterrorism efforts are 
potentially false. Although a group, like the KKK, has a documented history of 
religious motivations, the counterterrorist must consider all underlying ideology in 
the organization. Like the KKK, motivations may relate more to other factors, 
such as the political concerns of society at the time. Even when considering 
religious groups like the CSA, it is vital to understand the nuances of their 
particular ideology prior to engagement. Further, even groups like the KKK, that 
have similar basic ideologies, sometimes develop different focuses within 
individual Klaverns. For example, Spence’s True Knights of the KKK focused on 
the belief of the federal government as the enemy, while Thom Robb’s White 
Patriots of the KKK focused on combining Christian Identity theology with 
traditional Klan beliefs.569 
D. GROUP PARTICIPATION 
Several commonalities emerged related to the inducement to participate in 
the KKK and the CSA. The differences that emerged related mainly to the 
motivation of the individual research subjects. Common themes with group 
involvement in the KKK and the CSA included family, belonging, personal 
relationships, and recruitment. . For Spence, his participation in the Klan began 
567 Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant and Rebellious 
Christian Identity,” 45; Noble, Tabernacle of Hate, 88. 
568 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 33, 112–113; Spence, interview. 
569 Spence, interview; Brannan, “Violence, Terrorism, and the Role of Theology: Repentant 
and Rebellious Christian Identity,” 125–126. 
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with family ties and continued with personal relationships he developed.570 
Others join the KKK for the family orientation and sense of belonging not only to 
a group, but to a family as well.571 In addition, the most successful recruiting 
methods involve calling on those personal relationships, include the individual 
member’s friends.572 For Noble, his participation in the CSA began with personal 
relationship with friends and the camaraderie of the communal living 
arrangements.573 Others joined the CSA for the “family” gained by participation, 
in addition to an internal longing to belong to a group and something seen as a 
larger cause.574 As with the KKK, the most successful recruiting methods 
involved calling on personal relationships with former friends and biological 
family.575 The similar recruiting methods allow the groups to grow, while 
maintaining similar in-group dynamics because members will necessarily target 
like-minded people with whom they already have close personal relationships. 
SIT places the most importance on dynamics of the group because the 
individual identity ties to group membership in that it enables the individual to join 
the group.576 Once inside the group, individuals make social comparisons 
between themselves and both members of the group (in-group) and those 
outside the group (out-group).577 These comparisons to others determine the 
influence of both intergroup and out-group relations on the individual. Individuals 
necessarily self-identify as members of particular groups as part of both their 
personal and social identity.578 
570 Spence, interview. 
571 Ibid. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Noble, interview. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 21. 
577 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context, 96. 
578 Ibid., 100. 
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This research did show a similar motivation to participate in different types 
of right-wing groups, as understood through the lens of SIT. Although SIT has 
emerged in academia as the most valuable theoretical framework for 
counterterrorism efforts, its more common application today is to Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations. According to Brannan, issues arise when 
addressing right-wing terrorism because few of the individuals who commit acts 
of domestic terrorism, despite their similar ideology and ties to the movement, 
had the open support of a terrorist organization.579 SIT is potentially the building 
block for counterterrorism efforts related to the white power movement. 
According to Kerry Noble, the things that lead an individual to become involved 
with white supremacy are the same things that lead another individual to become 
involved with Islamic fundamentalism.580  
E. “BALANCED-POWER” AND KLAN VIOLENCE 
The only common themes that emerged in the response to the potential 
success of “balanced-power” were the view of the County Sheriff as the only 
ruling official and the need for trust and honesty in any process.581 Spence felt, 
for the KKK, the only way to counter violent extremism was with hard-power 
tactics using law enforcement investigative methods.582 Noble, on the other 
hand, advocated only a soft-power approach using whole community efforts.583 
Noble agreed the law enforcement officials must be honest and consider the 
background of the particular individual they target to know what values to play 
upon, such as family, religious, or political ideals.584 Both men agreed the Sheriff 
is in the best position to have success with any method or communication.585 
579 Brannan, “Left- and Right-wing Political Terrorism,” 55. 
580 Noble, interview. 
581 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
582 Spence, interview. 
583 Noble, interview. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid.; Spence, interview. 
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This research could not conclusively prove the feasibility of applying 
“balanced-power” to KKK violent extremism. Noble advocates using approaches 
very similar to Deardorff’s ROC Centers.586 However, while incentive to move 
forward with recommendations based on data from Noble’s CSA case study 
alone exists, it is not appropriate. The researcher must consider the data from 
Spence’s KKK case study. Although Spence’s data completely disproves the 
“balanced-power” approach to KKK counterterrorism efforts, Spence admittedly 
continues to hold similar beliefs to his Klan “brothers and sisters.”587 Further, 
although Spence claims no active involvement in the KKK “right now,” the 
researcher gets the impression Spence still lives in that world, with his finger on 
the pulse of the far right.588 If that is the case, it makes Spence’s contributions all 
the more vital related to this research. Perhaps most important is the need for the 
counterterrorist, law enforcement, and researchers, in general, to closely 
consider the specific group in question to understand the most appropriate way 
forward. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research, like all research, has limitations. A major limitation is the 
small number of case studies for comparison. Primary source research requires 
accessibility to individuals willing to cooperate with the researcher. Given the 
anti-government leanings of the right-wing movement, this is a problem, as the 
researcher is a member of local government. The implication is reliable primary 
sources active within the movement are less likely to sit down willingly with law 
enforcement, no matter the reason. The researcher must rely largely on “formers” 
for data collection.589 Although no less reliable, as they are former members 
involved with domestic terror plots, the pool of potential sources is much smaller. 
586 Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 223; 
Noble, interview. 
587 Spence, interview. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Noble, interview. 
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G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, further research into the potential of applying “balanced-power” to 
the right-wing movement is necessary. With a larger, more diverse pool of case 
studies, a definitive answer may be possible. It could be the idea itself is not 
feasible for application to the right wing. It could also be that Spence is potentially 
an outlier, but further research with a larger pool of sources is necessary for a 
definitive explanation. 
Second, related to research topic one, the possibility of countering KKK 
violent extremism in general, further research is also necessary. Several 
common themes emerged in the data that need exploration. The main 
commonality is the anti-government thread running through both the KKK and the 
CSA, although the research determined the KKK had political leanings and the 
CSA had differing religious leanings. Based on their similar anti-government 
views, however, both groups desired war with the U.S. government.590 The 
research determined that, unlike the common perception of racial hatred as 
motivation for right-wing violence, the potential motive might instead be anti-
government ideology. While the research did not prove the possibility of 
countering KKK violence, it does reveal the necessity of further research, but 
perhaps in a different direction. According to Chip Berlet’s research on militia 
involvement, radical change in conversation and addressing legitimate 
grievances is a step toward establishing a relationship.591 This method of 
“disarming” the movement previously proved successful with the Posse 
Comitatus, so perhaps it may again.592 It is then necessary to explore the 
possibility of counterterrorism efforts related to the anti-government factions of 
the right wing, and explore if this common thread runs through the right-wing 
movement as a whole. 
590 Noble, interview; Spence, interview. 
591 Berlet and Lyons, “Militia Nation,” 25. 
592 Ibid. 
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Third, it is necessary to explore the application of SIT in the context of 
practitioner application. As discussed, large contingents of individuals that self-
identify as Aryan reside in the DFW area. The researcher recommends training 
for law enforcement officers on the defining ideology, inter-group, in-group, and 
out-group relations within the white supremacist movement. The researcher 
further recommends education for both law enforcement, and the community at 
large, on the existing threat of extremist violence posed from within the white 
supremacist organizations. It is time society looks beyond ideologies potentially 
considered offensive to the individual people involved, in an effort to protect 
potential victims from right-wing extremist violence.  
David Brannan and Anders Strindberg are on the way to educating 
practitioners in their forthcoming work, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist 
Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners. The two provide a workbook for analyzing 
terrorist organizations, regardless of individual ideologies. Brannan and 
Strindberg use SIT to analyze groups, ideologies, and actions related to the 
contextual environment, which is necessary for determining the relevance of 
group actions or beliefs.593 While some may believe the study of psychology is 
more practical for analysis, Brannan and Strindberg aptly explain that 
psychological approaches fit more appropriately with study of the individual, as 
opposed to the group.594 As previously discussed, the applications of SIT assists 
in understanding the necessity of a positive association of membership with the 
in-group.595 The importance of Brannan and Strindberg’s work is they provide an 
analytical framework useful in analyzing individual groups that uses analytical 
markers to assist with the analysis, which is applicable to the street level 
practitioner.596  
593 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 16. 
594 The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement (New York, NY: 
Anti-Defamation League, August 9, 2010). 
595 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook 
for Practitioners, 26–27. 
596 Ibid., 37–40. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
While the research had limitations and did not prove four of the research 
questions, it remains valid nonetheless. The research did identify the common 
bond of anti-government rhetoric in vastly different right-wing organizations, 
specifically the KKK and the CSA. It raised awareness of the need to build upon 
Joel Dyer’s previous research on the “Freemen” movement, which, “applies to 
anyone claiming to be a sovereign.”597 Following the Oklahoma City bombing, 
awareness of this growing movement increased, but the more time that lapses, 
the less important it becomes. Watchdog organizations, such as the ADL, 
continue their focus on these groups, as evidenced in their publication, The 
Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement.598 
Researchers need to continue pursuit of primary source research in this arena, 
again building on Dyer’s previous work. 
Further, the application of SIT at a practitioner level is necessary. 
Although potentially useful in right-wing counterterrorism efforts, with continued 
research, the theory is invaluable at the practitioner level. Law enforcement 
officers encounter individuals every day where SIT would assist their 
understanding. It is necessary to know and understand any group’s ideology and 
theology prior to interactions. This baseline understanding can help even the 
street level officers in their performance of routine duties.  
This research did further support the validity of SIT in relation to terrorism 
studies. Through primary sources, the research was able to illustrate the 
importance of group interactions and group dynamics in right-wing organizations, 
even those committed to acts of domestic terrorism and war against the U.S. 
government. While not new information, the application to U.S. right-wing groups 
related to events in 1985, 1997, present-day associations with “formers,” and 
what the researcher believes to be those still on the fringes of the movement, 
597 Dyer, Harvest of Rage, 193. 
598 The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement. 
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further strengthens the use of SIT. It successfully describes past, present, right-
wing, and Islamist organizations with equal results, which are that individuals, in 
search of this positive feeling stemming from a distinct identity, will seek to join a 
group that will fulfill their emotional needs.599 The counterterrorist must be there 
to meet them, beyond hate. 
  
599 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 95. 
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